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The legal profession, steeped in tradition and precedent, is often leery of
change. For example, the legal community utilized scriveners until three hun-
dred years after the development of the Gutenberg flatbed printing press,'
and legal documents continue to ooze lawyerisms, tautologies, and other
language that has little, if any, practical value.' The profession's ability to
serve its primary purpose of facilitating the maintenance and smooth func-
tioning of society is hindered by its failure to avail itself of technological and
societal developments.3 Only by embracing and developing new techniques
will attorneys be equipped adequately to provide clients with competent and
complete legal services.
4
One of the newly developed techniques readily available to attorneys is
videotape recording. In 1969 a Florida appellate court became the first court
to rule on the admissibility of videotaped evidence. 5 Since then, the use of
videotape in the legal setting has blossomed. This medium has been increas-
ingly utilized in criminal cases as evidence of the defendant's statements,6 police
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1. See Salvan, Videotape for the Legal Community, 59 JUDICATURE 222, 229 (1975).
2. See, e.g., R. XVYrICK, PLAIN ENUSH FOR LAWYERs (1979); Squires & Mucklestone, A
Simple "Simple" Will, 57 WASH. L. Rnv. 461 (1982); Word, A Brief For Plain English Wills
and Trusts, 14 U. RICH. L. Rnv. 471 (1980).
3. See Leventhal, Professional Responsibility: Keynote Address of the Second Annual Baron
De Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 30 U. Mu L. Rnv. 789, 791 (1976).
4. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RisPoNsmarY Canon 1 (1979) (duty to maintain com-
petence of legal profession); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsmIrY EC 6-2 (1979) (duty
to continue legal education and remain "abreast of current legal literature and developments");
MODEL RuLms OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiLrrY Rule 1.1 comment (1984) (continuing study and
education necessary to maintain requisite legal competence).
5. Paramore v. Florida, 229 So. 2d 855, 858-59 (Fla. 1969) (videotaped confession of defen-
dant admitted), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 935 (1971).
6. See, e.g., Mueller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 788, 791 (Ind. 1988) (trial court did not err in
excluding videotape because of self-serving nature of defendant's statements); Smith v. State,
272 Ind. 328, 397 N.E.2d 959, 963 (1979); State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 552 P.2d 931, 937
(1976); State v. Braud, 475 So. 2d 29, 32 (La. Ct. App. 1985), cert. denied, 480 So. 2d 739
(La. 1986); People v. Higgins, 89 Misc. 2d 913, 392 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801-02 (1977). See also G.
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"sting" operations,' line-ups,' crime scenes," and statements of victims of
child sexual abuse."° In the civil arena, video depositions," "day-in-the-life"
JOSEPH, MODERN VISUAL EVIDENCE § 5.05, at 5-23 to 5-27 (1984 & Supp. 1988). But see Hen-
dricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 505-07 (8th Cir. 1972) (videotape not admissible to show accused
murderer's state of mind).
7. See, e.g., Allen v. State, 146 Ga. App. 815, 247 S.E.2d 540, 541-42 (1978); McBrady
v. State, 460 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ind. 1984); Gross v. State, 444 N.E.2d 296, 301 (Ind. 1983);
Bennett v. State, 423 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Ind. 1981); State v. Jeffers, 48 N.C. App. 663, 269 S.E.2d
731, 735 (1980). See generally G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 5.04, at 5-15 to 5-22.
8. See, e.g., Colbert v. United States, 471 A.2d 258, 261 (D.C. Ct. App. 1984); Bruce v.
State, 268 Ind. 180, 375 N.E.2d 1042, 1086 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978); People
v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1972); State v. Mayhue, 653 S.W.2d
227, 234 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See generally G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 5.06, at 5-28 to 5-32.
9. See, e.g., People v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1971); LaMotte
v. State, 495 N.E.2d 729, 733 (Ind. 1986); Gibbs v. State, 426 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697, 699 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972); State
v. Schlickenmayer, 334 N.W.2d 196, 199 (N.D. 1983); Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 276 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1025 (1981); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 266 (Utah
1980). See generally G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 5.03, at 5-12 to 5-14.
10. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (Supp. 1987); ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1987); Aaiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(B) (1987); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1346 (Deering Supp. 1988); CoLo. RV. STAT. § 18-3-413 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-86g (West Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.90,
92.53 (West Supp. 1988); HAw. R. EvID. 616; IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns 1988); IowA
CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West Supp. 1988); KA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3434, 38-1558, 38-1658
(1986 & Supp. 1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.350(2), 421.350(4) (Michie/Bobbs Merrill
1986); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:440.1 to 15:440.5 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1205 (Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAws, ch. 278, § 16D (Law. Co-op. 1988); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (Vest 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 491.675 to 491.693, 568.100 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-15-401 to 46-15-403
(1987); NEV. REv. STAT. § 174.227 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.13, 517.13a (Supp.
1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1984 & Supp. 1987); N.Y. Csni. PROC. LAw § 190.32
(McKinney Supp. 1988); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2151.3511, 2907.41 (Baldwin 1986-87); 22
OrLA. STAT. §§ 753, 1147 (Supp. 1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5984 (Purdon Supp. 1988);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(G) (Law. Co-op. 1985);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-12-9 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-7-116 (Supp. 1987); TEx.
CRM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-35-15.5 to
77-35-15.5.1 (Supp. 1987); VT. R. EviD. 807; Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.31(2), 967.04(7)-(10) (West
1987, West 1985 & Supp. 1987); UNIP. R. EvID. 807. See generally G. JOSEPH, supra note 6,
§ 5.09(3), at 5-49 to 5-56. Several courts have upheld the constitutionality of these statutes. See,
e.g., State v. Melendez, 135 Ariz. 390, 661 P.2d 654, 656-57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); McGuire
v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 702 S.W.2d 360, 361 (1986); People v. Municipal Court, No. A-750900
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 12, 1985); People v. Arbuckle, No. 85F00135 (Cal. Mun. Ct. June 17,
1985); People v. Mathes, 703 P.2d 608, 612 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Chambers v. State, 504
So. 2d 476, 477-78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); People v. Johnson, 497 N.E.2d 308, 314 (I!1.
Ct. App. 1986); Miller v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Altmeyer v. State,
496 N.E.2d 1328, 1331 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697 P.2d 836, 840
(1985); Commonwealth v. Willis, 716 S.W.2d 224, 229 (Ky. 1986); State v. Feazell, 486 So.
2d 327, 330-31 (La. Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 491 So. 2d 20 (La. 1986); State v. Twist,
528 A.2d 1250, 1256 (Me. 1987); Wildermuth v. State, 310 Md. 496, 530 A.2d 275, 285-87 (Md.
Ct. App. 1987); State v. Bass, 221 N.J. Super. 466, 535 A.2d 1, 5-6 (1987); State v. Tafoya,
105 N.M. 117, 729 P.2d 1371, 1373 (N.M. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 94, 728 P.2d 845
(1986); State v. Messier, 101 N.M. 582, 686 P.2d 272, 273 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984); People v.
Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977, 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986); State v. Lipp, No.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss1/3
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E-86-74 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 29, 1988); Commonwealth v. Bizzaro, 535 A.2d 1130, 1133-35
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); State v. Cooper, 353 S.E.2d 451, 456 (S.C. 1987); Whittemore v. State,
712 S.W.2d 607, 609-10 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ); Alexander v. State, 692 S.W.2d
563, 566-67 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1985, no writ); Jolly v. State, 681 S.W.2d 689, 695 (Tex.
Ct. App.-Houston [14th] 1984, no writ), rev'd, 739 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Contra
State v. Long, 742 S.W.2d 302, 319-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (videotape of child witness viola-
tion of criminal defendant's confrontation and due process rights); Powell v. State, 694 S.W.2d
416, 421 (rex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ) (Texas child witness videotape statute unconstitu-
tional as violation of confrontation right); Romines v. State, 712 S.W.2d 745, 753 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986). For further discussion on the use of videotaped testimony of victims of child sexual
abuse, see, e.g., Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and Other Emerg-
ing Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DIcK. L. REV. 645 (1985); Note, The Testimony
of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HAgv. L. Rnv.
806 (1984-85); Note, Does the Child Witness Videotape Statute Violate the Confrontation Clause?:
Article 38.071, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, 17 TEx. TECH. L. Rnv. 1669 (1986); Note,
Videotaping the Testimony of an Abused Child: Necessary Protection for the Child or Unwar-
ranted Compromise of the Defendant's Constitutional Rights?, 1986 UTAH L. REv. 461; Note,
Vermont Rule of Evidence 807 and the Confrontation Clause, 10 VT. L. REv. 497 (1985); Note,
Criminal Procedure-Child Witnesses-The Constitutionality of Admitting the Videotape
Testimony at Trial of Sexually Abused Children, 7 WmrrrmR L. Rnv. 639 (1985); Note, Videotaped
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: United States v. Binder, 23 WL'umTTE L. Rav. 193
(1987); Comment, Use of Videotaping to Avoid Traumatization of Child Sexual Abuse Victim-
Witnesses, 21 LAND & WATER L. Rv. 565 (1986); Comment, Televised Testimony vs. the Con-
frontation Clause... the Use of Videotapes in the Prosecution of Child Sexual Abuse, 23 Hous.
L. REv. 1215 (1986).
11. ALA. R. CIrv. P. 30(b)(4); ALASKA R. CIv. P. 30(b)(4); ARIZ. R. CIv. P. 30(b)(4); ARK.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 2025(l)(2) (Deering 1988); CoLo. R. CIrv. P. 30(b)(4);
DEL. Sup. CT. R. 30(b)(4); D.C. Sup. CT. R. 30(b)(4); FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.310(4); FLA. R. JUD.
Armi. 2.070(d); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-30(b)(4) (1982); IDAHO R. CIrv. P. 30(b)(4); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110A, para. 206(e), (f) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. R. TR. P. 30(B)(4); IowA R.
Civ. P. 140(b)(4); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230(4) (Supp. 1987); Ky. R. Cirv. P. 30.02(4); LA.
CODE Crv. PRoc. ANN. art. 1440 (West 1984); ME. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); MD. R. Cirv. P. 2-416;
MASS. R. Cirv. P. 30A; Mica. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2163(1) (Callaghan Supp. 1988); MiN. R.
Crv. P. 30.02(4); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-230(b) (Supp. 1987); Mo. R. CIrv. P. 57.03(c); MONT.
R. Cirv. P. 30(b)(4); NEv. REv. STAT. § 174.227 (1985); N.H. Rlv. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (Supp.
1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1988); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-30(b)(4); N.Y.
Crv. PRAc. L. & R. LAw § 3113(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988); N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, R. Civ.
P. 30(b)(4) (1983); N.D. R. Cirv. P. 30.1; Oao R. Civ. P. 30(b)(3); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 3207(c)(4)
(Supp. 1987); OR. R. Crv. P. 39(c)(4); PA. R. Civ. P. 4017.1; R.I. R. Cirv. P. 30(b)(2); S.C.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); S.D. CODIrED LAWS ANN. § 15-6-30(b)(4) (Supp. 1988); TENN. R. Cirv.
P. 30.02(4)(A)-(B); TEx. R. Civ. P. 202; UTAH R. CIv. P. 30(b)(4); VT. R. CIrv. P. 30(b); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-412.2 (1984); WASH. Sup. CT. R. 30(b)(4); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); Wyo.
R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4). See, e.g., Sims Consol., Ltd. v. Irrigation & Power Equip., Inc., 518 F.2d
413, 416-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975); Roberts v. Homelite Div. of Textron,
Inc., 109 F.R.D. 664, 666-68 (N.D. Ind. 1986), partial summary judgment granted on other
grounds, 649 F. Supp. 1440, 1447 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Lucien v. McLennand, 95 F.R.D. 525,
526 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Farahmand v. Local Properties, Inc., 88 F.R.D. 81, 83-85 (N.D. Ga. 1980);
Tsesmelys v. Dublin Truck Leas. Corp., 78 F.R.D. 181, 185-86 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Carson v.
Burlington N., Inc., 52 F.R.D. 492, 492-93 (D. Neb. 1971); Drake v. State, 467 N.E.2d 686,
690-91 (Ind. 1984); Mills v. Dortch, 142 N.J. Super. 410, 361 A.2d 606, 609 (1976). See also
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4); FED. R. CRim. P. 15(d); IND. R. TR. P. 30(B)(4); UNiF. AuDIo-VsuAL
DEPOSrrxON ACT §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 9-15 (Supp. 1987). For further discussion of the use of
videotaped depositions, see G. JosEPHI, supra note 6, §§ 1.0313], 2.01-3.07, 5.09[2], at 1-11 to
1-12, 2-1 to 3-40, 5-45 to 5-49; Ebel, Videotape Depositions in Federal Court, CASE & CoM.
(Jan.-Feb. 1988), at 3; Murray, Videotaped Depositions: Putting Absent Witnesses in Court,
68 A.B.A. J. 1402 (1982); Annotation, Use of Videotape to Take Deposition for Presentation
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documentaries,"2 and videotapes of accident scenes and reconstructions
3
routinely have been admitted into the record. Moreover, entire civil and
criminal trials are regularly videotaped and presented to juries in Ohio.1
4 Legal
commentators have also analyzed videotape applications for tax appeals and
land condemnation cases. 6
In the early 1980s, commentators began suggesting that videotape also has
a place in the probate process. 7 As the decade progressed, those suggestions
expanded into recommendations. Since 1983, at least fifteen articles have been
devoted exclusively to discussion on the potential uses of videotape in estate
planning. "8
at Civil Trial in State Court, 66 A.L.R.3d 637 (1975); Annotation, Admissibility of Videotape
Film in Evidence in Criminal Trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333 (1974); Annotation, Recording of Testimony
at Deposition by Other Than Stenographic Means Under Rule 30(b)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 16 A.L.R. Fed. 969 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Grimes v. Emplovers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 609-10 (D. Alaska
1977); Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1, 8 (1980). See also Heller, Buchanan
& Bros., Using Videotape to Effectively Prepare and Present Your Case, in LITiGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE SERIES, VIDEO TECHNIQUES IN TRIAl ND PRETiAL 7, 13-15 (F. Heller
ed. 1983); Heller, Buchanan & Bros., Admissibility Requirements of Videotape, in LITIGATION
AND ADmINSTRATrVE PRACTICE SERts, VIDEO TECHNIQUES IN TRIAL AND PRETRIAL 17, 21 (F.
Heller ed. 1983); G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.06, at 4-40 to 4-42.1; Dombroff, Videotape Evidence:
Day in the Life Presentations, 14 THE BRmF No. 4 (1985), reprinted in IN Focus (Fall 1986),
at 5; Malouf, The Attorney's View: A Day-in-the-Life, 2 HARD CoPY 12 (Jan. 1988).
13. See, e.g., Roberts v. Homelite Div. of Textron, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 664, 667-68 (N.D. Ind.)
(accident reenactment during video deposition), partial summary judgment granted on other
grounds, 649 F. Supp. 1440, 1447 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Zobler v. Winters, 109 Idaho 824, 712
P.2d 525, 528-29 (1985); American State Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 Ill. App. 3d 123,
371 N.E.2d 232, 239-40 (1977); Mills v. Nichols, 467 So. 2d 924, 931 (Miss. 1985); In re City
of Durham Annexation Ordinance No. 5791, 66 N.C. App. 472, 311 S.E.2d 898, 906-08 (1984);
Mize v. Skeen, 63 Tenn. App. 37, 468 S.W.2d 733, 737 (1971). See generally Heller, Buchanan
& Bos, Admissibility Requirements of Videotape, supra note 12, at 25-28; G. JOSEPH, supra
note 6, § 4.04[1], at 4-28 to 4-29.
14. Omo R. Cw. P. 40 (prerecorded testimony). See also McCrystal & Maschari, Will Elec-
tronic Technology Take the Stand? 11 U. TOL. L. REv. 239, 242 (1980); McCrystal, The Video
Trial Comes of Age, 57 JUDICATURE 446, 446 (1973-74); McCrystal & Young, Pre-recorded
Videotape Trials-An Ohio Innovation, 39 BROOKLYN L. 1Ev. 560 (1972-73).
15. MacHaffie, Videotaping of Property Tax Appeals, IN Focus (Summer 1985), at 23.
16. Searles, "The Use of Video in Land Proceedings: Its Value and Its Potential," Video
Law Seminar, National Network of Legal Video Companies (July 11, 1987).
17. See, e.g., Hurley, Taking Stock of Videotape Technology, DOCKET CALL, Fall 1982, at
5 (visual aids would help to accurately record will execution); McCrystal & Maschari, supra note
14, at 239, 249 (audio-visual aids will help clarify and correct faulty memories); Comment,
Videotape As a Tool in the Florida Legal Process, 5 NOVA L.J. 243, 248 (1981) (videotaped
will execution would "preserve the intent, competence and volition of the parties"). Cf. T.
ATRiNsON, WiLus § 63, at 296 (2d ed. 1953) (possible use of phonographic record or talking
moving picture).
18. Beyer, Avoiding Will Contests By Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony, EST. PLAN.
DEV. FOR TEX. PROF. (July 1984), at 1; Beyer, Video Requiem: Thy Will be Done, TR. & EST.
(July 1985), at 24; Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-Preventing Frustration
of the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1983); Beyer, Videotaping Will Execu-
tions, 2 AUDIo EsT. PLAN sel. 4 (Aug. 1985); Buckley, Devising Videotaped Will Statutes: A
Primer, BAlusTEra (Spring 1986), at 37; Buckley, Indiana's New Videotaped Wills Statute: Launch-
[Vol. 42:43
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At least 121 video companies in the United States belong to two national
organizations specializing in legal videotaping.' 9- The National Shorthand
Reporters Association offers a Certified Legal Video Specialist program to
help preserve professional quality in the field." Progressive advertisements
for videotaping firms frequently include the use of video in the probate con-
text as one of the available services.
2 '
Despite the increasing availability and apparent popularity of videotape
recordings, only a limited number of cases exist in which a videotape was
used in a probate action.2 2 This does not, however, reflect poorly upon the
value of probate video. Instead, the lack of reported decisions is likely due
to one or more of the following factors:
ing Probate into the 21st Century, 20 VAL. U.L. REv. 83 (1985); Buckley, The Case for the
Videotaped Living Will, PROB. & PROP. (May/June 1988), at 30; Buckley, Videotaped Living
Wills: Bringing Dying Declarations to Life, IN Focus (Fall 1987), at 12; Buckley, Videotaping
Living Wills: Dying Declarations Brought to Life, 22 VAL. U.L. REv. 39 (1987); Buckley,
Videotaped Will Statutes: The Indiana Experiment, and Other Model Provisions, IN Focus (Fall
1986), at 19; Buckley, Videotaped Wills: More Than a Testator's Curtain Call, TR. & EST. (Oct.
1987), at 48; Buckley & Buckley, Videotaped Wills, CAsE & COM. (Nov./Dec. 1984), at 3; Buckley
& Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontier In Estate Planning, I1 Omo N.U.L. REv. 271
(1984); Nash, A Videowill: Safe and Sure, 70 A.B.A. J. 87 (1984); Nash, The Videotape as
a Will: Valid and Valuable, IN Focus (Summer 1985), at 3.
New York, like most states, has a statute which provides an out-of-court procedure to "self-
prove" a written will without direct testimony of the witnesses. To corroborate the will by af-
fidavit, witnesses may identify "a court-certified photographic reproduction of the will." N.Y.
SuRR. CT. PRoc. ACT LAW § 1406(2) (McKinney 1967) (emphasis added). The photographic
reproduction is deemed an original for purposes of witness verification. Id. This law is designed
to accommodate the use of photostatic copies of wills so that witnesses need not travel to the
courthouse to authenticate the original registered will. However, under this statute, a court-certified
videotape copy could be shown to witnesses to "self-prove" the written will.
In a California case, a videotaped deposition of a terminally ill declarant was admitted to
enforce a request to disconnect a respirator. Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186,
209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222-23 (1984).
19. These video businesses are members of the National Network of Legal Video Companies,
Inc., in Cherry Hill, New Jersey, and the National Forensic Video Association in Richardson, Texas.
20. National Shorthand Reporters Association, Vienna, Virginia, Directory of Certified Legal
Video Specialists (undated brochure).
21. See, e.g., Advertisement, SuBPoENA (June 1988), at 18; Advertisement, SuBpoENA (June
1988), at 9; Advertisement, TRIAL (Mar. 1988), at 55.
22. See In re Estate of Robertson, 372 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (passing
reference to fact that attorney arranged for the videotaping of the will execution ceremony);
In re Estate of Seegers, 733 P.2d 418, 421-22 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (videotape of will execution
ceremony supported finding of undue influence); In re Purported Last Will and Testament of
Stotlar, CA No. 1149 (Del. Ch. 1987) (LEXIS, Del. Library), aff'd without opinion, 542 A.2d
358 (Del. 1988) and Trautwein v. O'Brien, No. 88AP-616, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS,
Ohio Library) (videotape of will execution ceremony supported finding of lack of testamentary
capacity). See also Disbrow v. Boehmer, 711 S.W.2d 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (videotaped deposi-
tion of medical testimony admissible in will contest); Swain v. Watts, CA No. 9423, slip op.
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (LEXIS, Ohio Library) (videotape of decedent inadmissible to prove ex-
istence of common law marriage); Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs. on Grievances & Discipline op. 88-014
(June 17, 1988) (videotape of will recitation & execution not prohibited under Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility).
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(1) A sufficient basis already exists under current law to support the ad-
missibility of videotape in certain contexts;23
(2) Because videotape was not used in the probate process until very recently,
testators who have used video have yet to die;
(3) The existence of the videotape itself ultimately reduces litigation;
2 4
(4) The failure of an attorney to prepare a videotape of the will execution
ceremony under circumstances where the reasonably prudent attorney would
do so does not lead to malpractice liability in most jurisdictions because the
lack of privity between the attorney and the intended will beneficiaries bars
the action;
25
(5) Many individuals, already disturbed by the estate planning process and
unpleasant thoughts about death, 26 are fearful of appearing on camera and
may prefer to forego using videotape techniques.
The nexus between videotape and the probate process is rapidly growing.
This article will analyze this relationship by examining how videotape may
be used in the probate process, the ways in which potential barriers to videotape
admissibility may be overcome, and the evidentiary requirements that must
be satisfied before a videotape may gain admission into evidence.
This article will then discuss a survey, conducted by the authors, of pro-
bate judges and review the limited legislation, existing or proposed, concern-
ing the use of videotape in the probate process. Finally, the authors will
speculate on the future use of videotape in probate actions.
Overview of Videotape in the Probate Process
Uses of Videotape
As Evidence
A properly prepared videotape of the will execution ceremony may prove
indispensable in discouraging will contest actions or ultimately winning them
if the contestant proceeds with the suit. The videotape may serve a useful
evidentiary function in demonstrating:
(1) Proper execution of a will, such as showing compliance with all will
formalities under state law;
23. See infra notes 92-115 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-Preventing Frustration of
the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY's L.J. 1, 38-39 (1983); Tinsman, Avoiding Probate
Litigation in the Future in Connection with Drafting Wills and Trusts, in STATE BAR oF TEXAs
Wm.L DRAFrnN J-8 (1989) ("most valid way to avoid a will contest ... is to do the same by
means of a video").
25. See R. M!LEN & V. LEvrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 622 (2d ed. 1981); D. MEISELMAN,
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: LAW AND PROCEDURE § 622 (2d ed. 1981); D. MEISELmAN, ATORNEY
MALPRACTICE: LAW Am PROCEDURE § 12:2 (1980). See generally D. HoRAN & G. SPELLMME,
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE 1-1 to 1-4 (1986) (discussing common law
privity and attorney-client relationships).
26. See Shaffer, The "Estate Planning" Counselor and Values Destroyed by Death, 55 IOWA





(2) Testamentary capacity because the testator's appearance, demeanor,
and actions are preserved for a more accurate determination of
testamentary capacity by the trier-of-fact;27
(3) Testamentary intent by showing close-up views of each page of the
will to assure that the document presented for probate is the same
as the one present during the execution ceremony;
(4) Contents of the will because a video recording of a written will would
reveal alterations, deletions, and other tampering;
(5) Absence of undue influence or fraud because the testator's appearance
and actions, as well as surrounding environment, are preserved on
tape;28 and
(6) Correct interpretation and construction of the will through the testator's
statements made contemporaneously with the will execution which are
useful to resolve ambiguities in the Vill.
29
As Testamentary Instrument
A more progressive use of videotape in the probate process is to utilize
the tape itself as a testamentary instrument, as the "document" that disposes
of the testator's property."0 There are, of course, obstacles to such use. For
example, wills normally must be in writing and contain the signatures of the
testator and attesting witnesses.' As discussed later in this article, these bar-
riers may be overcome because they were erected at a time when videotape
was far beyond the imaginations of those who formulated the requirements
of a valid will.
A videotaped will is more difficult to alter than a written document. Anyone
with correction tape or fluid, scissors, a photocopier, and a bit of evil in-
genuity can alter a written will. However, more sophisticated equipment and
skills are needed to make undetectable changes to a videotaped will. Accord-
27. But see Trautwein v. O'Brien, No. 88AP-616, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (LEXIS,
Ohio Library) (videotape of will execution ceremony "most compelling evidence presented on
the issue of testamentary capacity," with court finding lack of requisite capacity); In re Pur-
ported Last Will and Testament of Stotlar, CA No. 1149 (Del. Ch. 1987) (LEXIS, Del. library),
aff'd without opinion, 542 A.2d 358 (Del. 1988) (videotape of will execution ceremony showed
that testatrix "did not have the testamentary capacity to recollect or understand the nature of
the property that she was bequeathing").
28. But see In re Estate of Seegers, 733 P.2d 418, 421-22 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (videotape
of will execution ceremony supported finding of undue influence).
29. See, e.g., Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-Preventing Frustration of
the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 5-7 (1983); Buckley & Buckley, Videotaping
Wills: A New Frontier In Estate Planning, 11 Omo N.U.L. Rav. 271, 278-80 (1984); Nash, A
Videowill: Safe and Sure, 70 A.B.A. J. 87, 87-89 (1984).
30. See, e.g., Beyer, Videotaping the Will Execution Ceremony-Preventing Frustration of
the Testator's Final Wishes, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 51-55 (1983); Buckley, Videotaped Wills:
More Than a Testator's Curtain Call, TR. & EsT. (Oct. 1987), at 48; Nash, The Videotape as
a Will: Valid and Valuable, IN Focus (Summer 1985), at 3.
31. English Statute of Wills, 32 HE. 8, ch. 3 (1540). See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 50 (Deer-
ing 1974) (wills generally require writing); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 3-2.2 (McKinney
1980) (writing required for valid will). See generally T. ATKnsON, supra note 17, § 63.
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ingly, a videotaped will would strengthen the testator's ability to place his
testamentary desires beyond the reach of others, thus satisfying the ultimate




Using a videotape as evidence of the will execution ceremony or as the will
itself has tremendous advantages over the use of other evidence and types
of documents. First, an unaltered videotape is highly accurate. The tape reflects
the events exactly as they occurred during the execution ceremony thus
eliminating the necessity of relying upon witnesses whose memories fade and
impressions change as time passes.33 Likewise, the tape can serve as the
testator's statement of the dispositon of his estate without the intervention
of an attorney or other scrivener.
In addition, the testimony of witnesses and the reading of a written will
are incomplete views of the subject under evaluation-the testator's last wishes.
A videotape of a will execution ceremony preserves valuable nonverbal evidence
such as demeanor, voice tone and inflection, facial expressions, and gestures.
This type of evidence may be crucial in determining such issues as testamen-
tary capacity or freedom from undue influence. Similarly, using the videotape
as the will assures a firm connection between the testator and the actual words
used to effectuate his intent.
A third significant advantage of videotaped ceremonies and videotaped wills
is their tendency to act as deterrents to will contest actions. The testator is
the key witness in will contest actions, but of course, he is beyond the scope
of judicial process at the time his testimony is needed.3 4 Fortunately, however,
videotape can preserve this crucial testimony. This evidence is especially vital
to prepare when the testator is leaving property in an unusual manner (e.g.,
to a friend or charity to the exclusion of the spouse or children), or when
the testator has some type of disability not affecting testamentary capacity
(e.g., a testator who is blind, illiterate, or paralyzed by a stroke), but which
may give unhappy heirs an incentive to contest.
Finally, because "facing the reality of death and its attendant consequences
is one of the most difficult responsibilities in life,"' 35 probate video can help
the testator, his survivors, the court, and the jury better cope with this arduous
task. The testator may feel more confident that his desires will be carried
32. See generally Nash, The Videotape as a Will: Valid and Valuable, IN Focus (Summer
1985), at 3, 4.
33. See generally McCrystal & Maschari, supra note 14, at 249-52 (potential inaccuracies
of human memory creates inconsistencies, bias, prejudice and inaccuracy which slow the ad-
ministration of justice).
34. Several jurisdictions have statutes permitting wills to be admitted to probate prior to
the decedent's death. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-40-201 to 28-40-203 (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 30.1-08.1-01 to 30.1-08.1-04 (Supp. 1987); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2107.081 (Baldwin 1987).
35. Nelson & Starck, Formalities and Formalism: A CriticalLook At the Execution of Wills,
6 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 331, 348 (1979).
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out since there is more substantial evidence of his intent than a mere written
document.3" The survivors may gain solace from viewing the testator deliver-
ing his final message-a last memory of the testator that is preferable to that
of the funeral. Finally, the court and jury are more likely to believe what
they see and hear on a videotape than what is only in writing. Thus, a will
disinheriting a needy spouse or child is more likely to stand when the videotape
clearly shows the testator's capacity and intent.
Barriers to Videotape Admissibility in Probate
Videotaped wills must negotiate a treacherous gauntlet of evidentiary restric-
tions to be admitted either as evidence of the ceremony or, more particularly,
as the will itself. Although the probate obstacles are somewhat more deeply
entrenched than those applicable to visual evidence in general, the majority
of these can be overcome.
The Writing Requirement and Nuncupative Wills
Attempts to utilize videotape as a substitute for a written will, without
authorizing legislation, are doomed within the prevailing precedential
framework. The writing requirement is anchored by centuries of case law,"
with American and English probate statutes consistently requiring a written
will in all but exceptional circumstances.
38
Nuncupative wills are valid under many statutes, although historically
disfavored by the courts due to their vulnerability to fraud and perjury during
36. Cf. Swickard, Henry Ford's Video Asks No Fuss Over Will, Detroit Free Press, Sept.
24, 1988, at 1, col. I (Henry Ford II prepared a videotape one week after executing his will
and trust to explain reasons behind his distribution decisions).
37. See, e.g., Blacksher Co. v. Northrup, 176 Ala. 190, 57 So. 743, 744 (1911) (will must
be in writing to be effective); In re Carey's Estate, 56 Colo. 77, 136 P. 1175, 1176 (1913); Hatheway
v. Smith, 79 Conn. 506, 65 A. 1058, 1060-62 (1907); Noble v. Fickes, 230 II1. 594, 82 N.E.
950, 951 (1907) (first requirement for valid will is writing); Gump v. Gowans, 226 Ill. 635, 80
N.E. 1086, 1087 (1907); Steinkuehler v. Wempner, 169 Ind. 154, 81 N.E. 482, 483 (1907); Pyle
v. East, 173 Iowa 165, 155 N.W. 283, 285 (1915); Garnett v. Foston, 122 Ky. 195, 91 S.W.
668, 670 (1906); Nunn v. Ehlert, 218 Mass. 471, 106 N.E. 163, 164 (1914); Horn's Estate v.
Bartow, 161 Mich. 20, 125 N.W. 696, 697 (1910); Gordon v. Parker, 139 Miss. 344, 104 So.
77, 77-78 (1925); In re Charles' Estate, 118 Neb. 634, 225 N.W. 869, 870 (1929); Stevenson
v. Earl, 65 N.J. Eq. 721, 55 A. 1091, 1093 (1903); In re Stinson's Estate, 228 Pa. 475, 77 A.
807, 807-09 (1910); Wilson v. Craig, 86 Wash. 465, 150 P. 1179, 1180 (1915).
38. English Statute of Wills, 32 HEN. 8, ch. 3 (1540); Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3
(1676). See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 50 (Deering 1974) (writing required for valid will); IND.
CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-2(a) (Bums 1972) (all wills require writing except nuncupative); N.Y. EST.
PowERs & TR. LAw § 3-2.1 (McKinney 1981) (need writing for valid will); TEX. PROB. CODE
§ 59 (Vernon 1980) (wills require writing).
Most states recognize nuncupative wills as an exception to the writing requirement if certain
criteria are met. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 54 (Deering 1974) (oral will may be made by
one in active military service or in peril of death); N.Y. EsT. Powvms & TR. LAw § 3-2.2 (McKinney
1981) (nuncupative will valid if specified requirements satisfied); TEX. PROB. CODE § 65 (Vernon
1980) (nuncupative will valid if made in last sickness).
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probate.39 Nuncupative wills have most frequently been used by soldiers or
sailors who become fatally wounded or injured during active duty.40 Generally,
nuncupative wills have been accepted when the testator suffered from a final
illness from which he did not recover." The malady, according to some rules,
must have placed the testator in extreme distress, such that death appeared
imminent.4 2 The better rule would permit nuncupation if the testator reasonably
anticipated that his affliction was fatal and death was imminent, although
the testator need not have been suffering severely at the time the testamen-
tary words were spoken.43 In any event, death must actually occur as a result
of the sickness,44 and the oral testament must be reduced to writing within
the statutorily prescribed period (normally a matter of days).4s
Most nuncupative will statutes limit the use of oral wills to dispose of
personal property." This limitation arises from the common law under which
real property passes only by written will, but personalty may be bequeathed
39. Dorsey v. Sheppard, 12 G. & J. 192, 198 (Md. 1841); In re Yarnall, 4 Rawle 46, 62
(Pa. 1833); Godfrey v. Smith, 73 Neb. 756, 103 N.W. 450, 454 (1905) (nuncupative wills suspect
and subject to strict statutory compliance); In re Miller's Estate, 47 Wash. 253, 91 P. 967, 968
(1907) (nuncupative dispositions not favored and must comply with statutory construction)
40. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 12 Barb. 148, aff'd, 8 N.Y. 196, 203 (1853).
41. In re Dreyfus' Estate, 175 Cal. 417, 165 P. 941, 941 (1917); Harrington v. Stees, 82
Ill. 50, 53 (1876); Irwin v. Rogers, 91 Wash. 284, 157 P. 690, 691 (1916). See also IND. CODE
ANN. § 29-1-5-4(a) (Burns 1972); MODEL EXECUTION oF WILLS ACT § 6.
42. IND. CODE Am.9. § 29-1-5-4(a) (Bums 1972) ("imminent peril of death"). See also Sykes
v. Sykes, 2 Stew. 364, 369 (Ala. 1830); Scaife v. Emmons, 84 Ga. 619, 10 S.E. 1097, 1097-98
(1890) (nuncupation must be made when testator "in extremis" with no opportunity to write
will); Carroll v. Bonhan, 42 N.J. Eq. 625, 9 A. 371, 371 (1887) (oral will must be made in
last sickness as necessity); Prince v. Hazzleton, 20 Johns. 502, 514 (N.Y. 1822); In re Shover's
Estate, 258 Pa. 70, 101 A. 862, 862-63 (1917) (where under circumstances testator capable of
dictating will to writing, oral will held invalid); In re Rutt's Estate, 200 Pa. 549, 50 A. 171,
173-74 (1901); In re Yarnall, 4 Rawle 46, 65 (Pa. 1833); Jones v. Norton, 10 Tex. 120, 121-22
(1853); Winn v. Bob, 30 Va. 140 (1931). Cf. Harrington v. Stees, 82 Ill. 50, 53-54 (1876); Baird
v. Baird, 70 Kan. 564, 79 P. 163, 166-67 (1905) (noting "last sickness" not required for valid
oral will at common law); Godfrey v. Smith, 73 Neb. 756, 103 N.W. 450, 454-55 (1905) (oral
will valid if made in last sickness even if testator had ability or time to make or dictate written
will); In re Miller's Estate, 47 Wash. 253, 91 P. 967, 968 (1907) (additional requirements for
valid oral will imposed by caselaw not necessary if statute satisfied).
43. Baird v. Baird, 70 Kan. 564, 79 P. 163, 166-67 (1905) (last sickness need not be testator's
"last breath" or prevent him from making written will); In re Miller's Estate, 47 Wash. 253,
91 P. 967, 968 (1907).
44. Baird v. Baird, 70 Kan. 564, 79 P. 163, 166 (1905) (last sickness only requires that nun-
cupation occur during illness from which death ultimately results); In re Miller's Estate, 47 Wash.
253, 91 P. 967, 968 (1907) (quoting Baird). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-4(a) (Burns 1972).
45. Baird v. Baird, 70 Kan. 564, 79 P. 163, 165 (1905) (ten days in accordance with statute);
Kellner v. Hagood, 39 Ohio App. 351, 177 N.E. 637, 638 (1930) (ten days in compliance with
statute). See also IiD. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-4(a)(2) (Burns 1972) (30 days); MODEL EXECUTION
OF WLS ACT § 6(1)(b) (30 days).
46. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-4(3)(b) (Burns 1972) (only personal property up to
one thousand dollars in value may be disposed of by nuncupative will); MODEL EXECUTION OF
WmILs ACT § 6(2).
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orally.,7 Dollar limitations also apply under most nuncupative will statutes."
Nuncupative wills are subject to the most stringent documentary requirements,
and strict compliance with statutory precepts is mandated. 9
Videotaped wills arguably qualify as nuncupative wills because the record-
ing is verbal as well as visual. Under appropriate circumstances, especially
if the testator is too ill to execute a written document, the videotape provides
excellent corroboration of a subsequently transcribed writing. Testamentary
capacity and intent apparent in the recorded images and soundtrack might
easily dispel a will contestant's allegations that a severe, ultimately terminal
affliction had substantially impaired the testator's mental faculties. The record-
ing of the oral testament as actually spoken to the witnesses would facilitate
probate of nuncupative wills much more effectively than the questionable
memories of witnesses hastily gathered to hear the testator's final words.
Because the objective of the current transcription requirement is to render
an accurate representation of the testator's intentions and oral statements,
a videotape undeniably would be more reliable.
From a practical perspective, however, most wills offered for probate are
formulated when the testator was healthy. Few wills result from "deathbed
declarations," although historically testamentary disposition occurred
predominantly in this fashion." Most fatally afflicted individuals as well as
the majority of persons, die intestate. Usually, those who make wills are suf-
ficiently robust to sign the written version. Thus, videotape would rarely be
applied to nuncupative practice, and its use would remain limited to eviden-
tiary functions.
At least one court has specifically addressed the use of magnetic tape to
establish a valid will. In In re Estate of Reed,5' the Wyoming Supreme Court
ruled that an audio recording of the decedent discussing the disposition of
his property could not function as a will under state law.
52
Some state legislatures are considering amending their probate codes to
permit video recordings to operate as valid Wills. 3 Other legislatures have
47. Maurer v. Reifschneider, 89 Neb. 673, 132 N.W. 197, 198 (1911); Lewis v. Aylott, 45
Tex. 190, 199 (1876); Irwin v. Rogers, 91 Wash. 284, 157 P. 690, 691-92 (1916); In re Davis'
Will, 103 Wis. 455, 79 N.W. 761, 762 (1899).
48. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-4(3)(b) (Bums 1972) (one-thousand-dollar limitation);
TEx. PROB. CODE § 65 (Vernon 1980) (thirty-dollar limitation unless three witnesses available);
MODEL ExECUTION OF Wius ACT § 6(2).
49. Scaife v. Emmons, 84 Ga. 619, 10 S.E. 1097, 1097 (1890) (oral wills subject to "strictness
of proof in all essential points"); Prendergast v. Prendergast, 16 La. Ann. 219, 222 (1861); Godfrey
v. Smith, 73 Neb. 756, 103 N.W. 450, 454 (1905); In re Yarnall, 4 Rawle 46, 62 (Pa. 1833);
Brown v. State, 87 Wash. 44, 151 P. 81, 83 (1915).
50. See Beyer, The Will Execution Ceremony-History, Significance, and Strategies, 29 S.
TEx. L. Rv. 413, 415-17 (1988).
51. In re Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1983).
52. Id. at 833. For a discussion of In re Estate of Reed, see Note, Probate-The Enforce-
ment of Unwritten Wills, 20 LAND & WATER L. REv. 279 (1985).
53. See, e.g., H.B. 3030, 202nd N.J. Leg., 1st yr. Sess. 1986.
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examined more narrowly drawn resolutions allowing video recordings to serve
merely evidentiary functions in the probate of a written will.
s"
Testamentary Intent
The intentions of the testator are usually determined from the complete
will construed in its entirety."5 This rule is often called the "four-corners
doctrine" because intent is determined from the language as expressed within
the four corners of the instrument.5s
Ambiguities may arise within the written declaration, and often intent must
be clarified by extrinsic evidence. When intent is unclear in the will, cir-
cumstances surrounding the drafting57 and execution 8 may be considered. This
54. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3(d) (Bums Supp. 1988); S. Res. 5098, 210th N.Y. Leg., (1987-88);
Tex. H.B. 247, 69th Leg. (1985); Tex. S.B. 732, 69th Leg. (1985).
55. Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. 112, 126 (1894); Maddock v. Haines, 88 F.2d 350, 351
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 690 (1937); Kidd v. Borum, 181 Ala. 144, 61 So. 100, 104
(1913); Stayton v. Stayton, 198 Ark. 1178, 132 S.W.2d 830, 834 (1939); In re Torregano's Estate,
54 Cal. 2d 234, 5 Cal. Rptr. 137, 352 P.2d 505, 514 (1960); Mitchell v. Reeves, 123 Conn. 549,
196 A. 785, 788 (1938); Walker v. Thomas, 64 App. D.C. 148, 75 F.2d 667, 668-69 (1935);
Trotter v. Van Pelt, 44 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215, 218 (1940); McKain v. Allen, 214 Ga. 820, 108
S.E.2d 319, 322 (1959); Lydick v. Tate, 380 Ill. 616, 44 N.E.2d 583, 591-92 (1942); Quinn v.
Peoples' Tr. & Say. Co., 223 Ind. 317, 60 N.E.2d 281, 286 (1945); In re Miller's Estate, 243
Iowa 920, 54 N.W.2d 433, 435 (1952); Selzer v. Selzer, 146 Kan. 273, 69 P.2d 708, 710 (1937);
Ford's Adm'r v. Wade's Adm'r, 242 Ky. 18, 45 S.W.2d 818, 819 (1931); Succession of Allen,
48 La. Ann. 1036, 20 So. 193, 196 (1896); Roberts v. Stevens, 84 Me. 325, 24A. 873, 874 (1892);
Grace v. Continental Tr. Co., 169 Md. 653, 182 A. 573, 575 (1936); Salter v. Salter, 338 Mass.
391, 155 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1959); In re Scheyer's Estate, 336 Mich. 645, 59 N.W.2d 33, 35 (1953);
In re Oertle's Will, 34 Minn. 173, 24 N.W. 924, 926 (1885); Slaughter v. Gaines, 220 Miss.
755, 71 So. 2d 760, 763 (1954); Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. Hovey, 319 Mo. 192, 5 S.W.2d
437, 441 (1927); Jacobsen v. Farnham, 155 Neb. 776, 53 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1952); Fowler v.
Whelan, 83 N.H. 453, 144 A. 63, 65 (1928); Miller v. Worrall, 62 N.J. Eq. 776, 48 A. 586,
587 (1901); In re Schliemann's Will, 259 N.Y. 497, 182 N.E. 153, 156 (1932); Margulis v. Teichman,
127 Misc. 2d 168, 485 N.Y.S.2d 930, 932 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Holland v. Smith, 224 N.C. 255,
29 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1944); Cunningham v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 186 Okla. 429, 98 P.2d 57, 58-59
(1939); Creamer v. Harris, 90 Ohio St. 160, 106 N.E. 967, 968 (1914); Gildersleeve v. Lee, 100
Or. 578, 198 P. 246, 248 (1921); In re Bigony's Estate, 397 Pa. 102, 152 A.2d 901, 903 (1959);
Ryan v. Monast, 67 R.I. 377, 24 A.2d 615, 617 (1942); Quick v. Owens, 198 S.C. 29, 15 S.E.2d
837, 844 (1941); Burton v. Kinney, 191 Tenn. 1, 231 S.W.2d 356, 357-58 (1950); Quillmans v.
Koonsman, 154 Tex. 401, 279 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1955); In re Robinson's Will, 101 Vt. 464, 144
A. 457, 459 (1929); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809, 811 (1951); Behrens v. Baumann,
66 W. Va. 56, 66 S.E. 5, 6 (1909); In re Parker's Will, 273 Wis. 29, 76 N.W.2d 712, 713-14 (1956).
56. Park v. Powledge, 198 Ala. 172, 73 So. 483, 484 (1916) (testator's intent determined
from four comers of instrument); Bennett v. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434, 75 N.E. 339, 341 (1905)
(intent drawn from all parts of document); Lyter v. Vestal, 355 Mo. 457, 196 S.W.2d 769, 771
(1946); Jacobsen v. Farnham, 155 Neb. 776, 53 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1952) (in construing will,
intent determined from face or four comers of instrument); Christ's Home v. Mattson, 140 N.J.
Eq. 433, 55 A.2d 14, 17 (1947); Williams v. Rand, 223 N.C. 734, 28 S.E.2d 247, 248 (1943);
Gildersleeve v. Lee, 100 Or. 578, 198 P. 246, 248 (1921).
57. Adams v. Cowen, 177 U.S. 471, 476 (1900); Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Humphrys, 97
F.2d 849, 855 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 628 (1938); Rufty v. Brantly, 204 Ark. 32, 161
S.W.2d 11, 13 (1942); In re Wolf's Estate, 128 Cal. App. 305, 17 P.2d 1052, 1054 (1932) (extrinsic
evidence of house number and name of street admissible to supplement property description);
Caracci v. Lillard, 7 Ill. 2d 382, 130 N.E.2d 514, 516-17 (1955) (extrinsic evidence showing nature
[Vol. 42:43
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process may require an examination of separate written documents.5 9
A videotape recording of the testator reciting the written will, as well as
addressing his desires to the camera (and future audience), counsel or witnesses,
would not be admissible to elaborate upon or alter lucidly detailed expres-
sions of intent in the will. Videotape would be accepted only to eliminate
ambiguities in the writing, just as other forms of extrinsic evidence may be
examined.
The superiority of videotape exists in its ability to present to the trier-of-
fact an accurate depiction of the testator's objectives. Other evidence may
consist of the testimony of relatives, friends, or perhaps witnesses to the
execution, all of whom may have conversed with the decedent regarding his
wishes. Writings alleged to be the testator's may be offered to elucidate matters.
Much of this evidence may be contradictory, depending upon the interests
of the party offering the proof. This evidence presents, at best, second-hand
accounts of testamentary intent that may not accurately reflect the true wishes
of the decedent. A video recording of the testator actually elaborating on
intent would be much more persuasive and compelling than other forms of
extrinsic proof. Regarding issues of intent, the trier-of-fact may be satisfied
solely upon presentation of such video corroboration.
Testamentary Capacity
Extrinsic evidence is most frequently employed in cases in which the testator's
mental faculties are questioned. Courts routinely admit evidence concerning
the testator's state of mind immediately before and after the will execution."0
Such proof is intended to suggest the testator's mental fitness during execu-
of testator's property and relation to family named in will admissible); Jones v. Holloway, 183
Md. 40, 36 A.2d 551, 553 (1944); Salter v. Salter, 338 Mass. 391, 155 N.E.2d 430, 431 (1959);
Lee v. Foley, 224 Miss. 684, 80 So. 2d 765, 767 (1955); Lyter v. Vestal, 355 Mo. 457, 196 S.W.2d
769, 771 (1946); In re Dimmitt's Estate, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N.W.2d 752, 757 (1942); Witham v.
Witham, 156 Or. 59, 66 P.2d 281, 286 (1937); In re Bigony's Estate, 397 Pa. 102, 152 A.2d
901, 903 (1959); In re McDonald's Estate, 20 Wis. 2d 63, 121 N.W.2d 245, 248 (1963).
58. Giles v. Little, 104 U.S. 291, 294 (1881), overruled on other grounds, Roberts v. Lewis,
153 U.S. 367, 379 (1894); Evans v. Ockershausen, 69 App. D.C. 285, 100 F.2d 695, 704 (1938),
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 633 (1939); Caracci v. Lillard, 7 Ill. 2d 382, 130 N.E.2d 514, 516 (1955);
Robinson v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 180 Md. 336, 24 A.2d 299, 300 (1942); Noble v. Noble, 205
Okla. 91, 235 P.2d 670, 673 (1951); In re Keefer's Estate, 353 Pa. 281, 45 A.2d 31, 32 (1946);
Guilliams v. Koonsman, 154 Tex. 401, 279 S.W.2d 579, 581 (1955); Collins v. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co., 178 Va. 501, 17 S.E.2d 413, 417 (1941); In re Parker's Will, 273 Wis. 29, 76
N.W.2d 712, 714 (1956).
59. See, e.g., Margulis v. Teichman, 127 Misc. 2d 168, 485 N.Y.S.2d 930, 932-33 (1985).
60. O'Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala. 222, 227 (1884); In re Klopstock's Estate, 31 Cal. App.
2d 568, 88 P.2d 722, 724 (1939) (contestant must offer proof of insanity affecting testator's
ultimate execution); Terry v. Buffington, 11 Ga. 337, 342 (1852); Griffith v. Thrall, 109 Ind.
App. 141, 29 N.E.2d 345, 349 (1940); Arbogast v. MacMillan, 221 Md. 516, 158 A.2d 97, 102
(1960); Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 269, 300 (Md. 1833); In re Haslick's Will, 195 Mich. 432,
161 N.W. 965, 968 (1917) (numerous witnesses testified as to opinion of testator's competency
when made will); In re Forsythe's Estate, 221 Minn. 303, 22 N.W.2d 19, 25 (1946); Surface
v. Bentz, 228 Pa. 610, 77 A. 922, 924 (1910).
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tion,6 ' although this may only be inferred, especially where testamentary
capacity fluctuated from moment to moment. Ideal documentation focuses
upon soundness of mind at the instant of execution.6 Statements by the testator
prior or subsequent to execution can be especially probative, if they are not
too far removed in time from the event.63 Visual documentation of the
testator's physical health may infer mental fitness or lack thereof. In one early
case, a photograph was admitted to demonstrate the testator's physical con-
dition at the time of execution which, in turn, reflected his mental abilities.6 '
Videotape is clearly superior to any secondary source of information regard-
ing capacity inquiries. When videotape is used, the court need not rely upon
witnesses, who may be unavailable years after execution, to testify during
probate proceedings about a brief and perhaps single encounter with the
testator. Relatives or friends on both sides of a will contest provide suspect
proof because conflicting interests may color their recollections. Even the self-
proving affidavit, generally regarded as being of high evidentiary value, is
an easily executed writing routinely signed by witnesses and testators. As an
evidentiary device for establishing testamentary capacity, the self-proving docu-
ment simply creates a hollow presumption which, once contraverted by will
opponents, crumbles uselessly into mere surplusage. A video recording of the
testator's will recitation, colloquy with attorney and witnesses, and execution
of the document allows judges and juries to evaluate the testator's mental
condition. In most cases, more convincing evidence is not likely to be
uncovered.
Videotaped presentations are often criticized because they are allegedly sub-
ject to manipulation. Arguably, the testator may appear mentally capable when,
in fact, he is wandering aimlessly in the distant recesses of his mind. Such
contentions overlook the trier-of-fact's ability to discern possible distortions.
Usually, judges and juries are composed of intelligent persons who can spot
61. In re Alexander's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 1, 295 P. 53, 56 (1931); Pardue v. Pardue, 312
Ky. 370, 227 S.W.2d 403, 405 (1950); Ergang v. Anderson, 378 Ill. 312, 38 N.E.2d 26, 27 (1941);
In re Bullard's Estate, 124 Minn. 27, 144 N.W. 412, 413 (1913).
62. In re Walter's Estate, 77 Ariz. 122, 267 P.2d 896, 901 (1954); In re Thomas' Estate,
144 Colo. 358, 356 P.2d 963, 964 (1960); In re Ring's Estate, 237 Iowa 953, 22 N.W.2d 777,
784, modified on other grounds, 24 N.W.2d 121, 121 (1946).
63. Lipphard v. Humphrey, 209 U.S. 264, 273 (1908) (statements made more than three years
after execution too remote); Mason v. Bowen, 122 Ark. 407, 183 S.W. 973, 975-76 (1916); In
re Lenci's Estate, 106 Cal. App. 171, 288 P. 841, 844 (1930); Morgan v. Morgan, 30 App. D.C.
436, 447 (1908); Credille v. Credille, 123 Ga. 673, 51 S.E. 628, 630 (1905); Ravenscroft v. Stull,
280 II1. 406, 117 N.E. 602, 603 (1917) (declarations made four or five years before death held
too remote); Ipsen v. Ruess, 239 Iowa 1376, 35 N.W.2d 82, 92 (1948); Lane v. Moore, 151
Mass. 87, 23 N.E. 828, 828 (1890); Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369, 412 (1870); O'Dell v. Goff,
149 Mich. 152, 112 N.W. 736, 739 (1907); In re Forsythe's Estate, 221 Minn. 303, 22 N.W.2d
19, 25 (1946); Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41, 45 (1896); Waterman v. Whitney,
11 N.Y. 157, 168 (1854); Executors of Reel v. Reel, 8 N.C. 248, 268 (1821).
64. Brownlie v. Brownlie, 357 Ill. 117, 191 N.E. 268, 271 (1934). Contra, Spiers v. Hender-
shott, 142 Iowa 446, 120 N.W. 1058 (1909) (photograph admissible to prove testator's physical
appearance but not mental condition); Varner v. Varner, 16 Ohio C.C. 386, aff'd without opin-
ion 62 Ohio St. 645, 58 N.E. 1102 (1898) (photograph inadmissible to prove testamentary capacity).
[Vol. 42:43
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol42/iss1/3
19891 THE PR OBA TE PROCESS 57
a scam as easily as lawyers can invent them. Where a testator faces a barrage
of leading questions during the execution ceremony, or is reduced to nodding
assent at the direction of counsel, admission of the video recording, as proof
of capacity, may ultimately benefit the will contestants.
65
Unless the testator can demonstrate mental capacity through dialogue,
soliloquy, or conduct, the videotape will not likely be utilized as evidence.
Conversely, if mental capacity is evident on video, the trier-of-fact may decide
its validity along with contrary or supplemental proof. The risk that video
evidence may be deceptive is present in all evidence: wvitnesses perjure,
documents are falsified, and exhibits can be crafted to prejudice interpreta-
tions. A certain degree of faith must be afforded the trier-of-fact in detecting
irregularities in evidence.
Will Execution
Written wills submitted for probate are typically presumed to have been
executed pursuant to state statute, unless defects can be readily detected in
the attestation or acknowledgment provisions. 6 The presumption is, of course,
rebuttable. Parol evidence may be introduced to bolster the validity of the
document; 7 for instance, samples of the decedent's or witnesses' handwriting
may be presented.6
8
The simplest use of videotape in probate proceedings is to establish satisfac-
tory execution of the written will. No evidence is superior to videotape's ability
to document the presence and proximity of the testator and witnesses, or to
prove that the signatures on the paper are genuine. The ceremony is preserved
exactly as it transpired. If improper execution is alleged, a video recording
of the event would instantly rebut the allegation.
65. See, e.g., In re Purported Last Will and Testament of Stotlar, CA No. 1149 (Del. Ch.
1987) (LEXIS, Del. library), aff'd without opinion, 542 A.2d 358 (Del. 1988) (videotape of will
execution ceremony supported finding of lack of testamentary capacity). See also Letter from
Steven M. Prye to William R. Buckley (June 3, 1988) (regarding New York Senate Resolution
No. 5098).
66. In re Pitcairn's Estate, 6 Cal. 2d 730, 59 P.2d 90, 92-93 (1936) (prima facie case of
proper execution when attestation clause appears proper); Gillis v. Gillis, 96 Ga. 1, 23 S.E. 107,
111 (1895); Martin v. Martin, 334 Ill. 115, 165 N.E. 644, 647 (1929) (all presumptions in favor
of proper execution and attestation); Burkland v. Starry, 361 Mo. 348, 234 S.W.2d 608, 610
(1950); In re McCarthy's Estate, 265 Wis. 548, 61 N.W.2d 819, 822-23 (1953).
67. Adams v. Norris, 64 U.S. 353, 368 (1860); Reed v. Hendrix' Ex'r, 180 Ky. 57, 201 S.W.
482, 487 (1918); Ferris v. Neville, 127 Mich. 444, 86 N.W. 960, 962 (1901); German Evangelical
Bethel Church v. Reith, 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S.W.2d 1057, 1061 (1931); In re Bragg's Estate, 106
Mont. 132, 76 P.2d 57, 63 (1938).
68. Woodruff v. Hundley, 127 Ala. 640, 29 So. 98, 101 (1900); Noblit v. Noblit, 223 Ark.
220, 265 S.W.2d 520, 520 (1954); In re Tyler's Estate, 121 Cal. 405, 53 P. 928, 929 (1898);
Hobart v. Hobart, 154 Ill. 610, 39 N.E. 581, 582 (1895); German Evangelical Bethel Church
v. Reith, 327 Mo. 1098, 39 S.W.2d 1057, 1061 (1931); In re Claflin's Will, 73 Vt. 129, 50 A.
815, 816 (1901); In re Maresh's Will, 177 Wis. 194, 187 N.W. 1009, 1010 (1922). See also Thompson
v. Freeman, 149 So. 740 (Fla. 1933) (photograph admissible to prove testator's signature as seen
by witness on lost will).
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The General Assembly of Indiana, impressed with videotape's value in
demonstrating proper will execution, enacted legislation in 1985 authorizing
video evidence on this issue.69 More extensive applications of videotape were
also suggested to the Assembly,"0 but these have yet to become law.
Occasionally, in contests raising doubts about proper execution, the integrity
of the will itself is assailed. The presence of loose sheets or nonsequential
pages of the will may undermine confidence in the original document. Because
courts allow parol evidence to link separate pages,7" videotape could provide
the definitive nexus between pages of the instrument. By recording close-up
shots of the written will page by page during the execution ceremony, videotape
eliminates any uncertainty that the document presented at probate is defec-
tive. Similarly, writings incorporated into the will by reference may be
videotaped to facilitate accurate identification.
Fraud and Undue Influence
When discussing the problem of undue influence, attorneys occasionally
allude to the image of unscrupulous relatives holding a gun to the testator's
head. That image, albeit exaggerated for its comic value, is not without truth.
Surreptitiously, those wielding coercive forces may influence the testator toward
a disposition of his assets to their benefit. Influenced by their affected care
and concern, the testator drafts or modifies his will to reward his "loving"
relations or friends.
Such "behind-the-scenes" machinations are commonplace in the arena of
undue influence, but the pressures are rarely exerted at the execution ceremony
or during the attorney's drafting of the document. Counsel, in fact, often
knows nothing of these lobbyists. The testator enthusiastically signs the will,
and only upon probate does the forgotten family or acquaintances object.
Apart from the written will, considerable evidence is admissible to
demonstrate fraud and undue influence. 72 Indirect proof may reveal the
mysterious threads that are alleged to constitute improper prompting or
manipulation.7 3 Because undue influence must have infected the testator's judg-
69. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3(d) (Bums Supp. 1988).
70. See, e.g., H.B. 1087, 105th Ind. Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (1988); H.B. 1181, 105th
Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1987).
71. In re Swendsen's Estate, 43 Cal. App. 2d 551, 111 P.2d 408, 410 (1941); Palmer v. Owen,
229 IU. 115, 82 N.E. 275, 276 (1907); Cole v. Webb, 220 Ky. 817, 295 S.W. 1035, 1037 (1927);
Appeal of Sleeper, 129 Me. 194, 151 A. 150, 153 (1930); In re Swaim's Will, 162 N.C. 213,
78 S.E. 72, 73 (1913); In re Kaiser's Estate, 150 Neb. 295, 34 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1948); In re
Johnson's Will, 80 N.J. Eq. 525, 85 A. 254, 256-57 (1912); In re Allen's Will, 282 N.Y. 492,
27 N.E.2d 22, 24 (1940).
72. Gotthardt v. Adlung, 246 F.2d 674, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Ofstad v. Sarconi, 126 Colo.
565, 252 P.2d 94, 97 (1952); Connecticut Jr. Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 188 Conn. 1, 448 A.2d
190, 194 n.9 (1982); Hopkins v. McClure, 45 So. 2d 656, 657 (Fla. 1950); Iddings v. Iddings,
7 Serg. & R. 111, 114 (Pa. 1821); In re Gnirrep's Will, 2 A.D.2d 404, 156 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697-98
(N.Y. App. Div. 1956).
73. In re Newhall's Estate, 190 Cal. 709, 214 P. 231, 236 (1923) (evidence of undue influence
primarily circumstantial); In re Bucher's Estate, 48 Cal. App. 2d 465, 120 P.2d 44, 48 (1941);
In re Shell's Estate, 28 Colo. 167, 63 P. 413, 414 (1900); Aldrich v. Aldrich, 215 Mass. 164,
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ment at the time of execution,74 the court will accept evidence prior or subse-
quent to will execution so long as it is not too remote from the date of execu-
tion." Since the influencer may have been present for lengthy periods, the
issue of remoteness is best left to the court. 76 Proof of the testator's age or
health (and thus, resistance to outside influences) 7" has been considered, along
with proof of certain relatives' access to the testator, 7 the peculiarity of devises
or beneficiaries named in the will,7 9 prior wills,8 and testamentary declara-
tions made outside the will but contemporaneous to execution.' Testimony
102 N.E. 487, 489 (1913) (evidence of particular circumstances show undue influence); Haines
v. Hayden, 95 Mich. 332, 54 N.W. 911, 915 (1893); Meier v. Buchter, 197 Mo. 68, 94 S.W.
883, 889 (1906); In re Bowman's Estate, 143 Neb. 440, 9 N.W.2d 801, 805 (1943); In re Noren's
Estate, 119 Neb. 653, 230 N.W. 495, 498 (1930); Culpepper v. Robie, 155 Va. 64, 154 S.E.
687, 696 (1930).
74. Knox v. Knox, 95 Ala. 495, 11 So. 125, 128 (1891); In re Kaufman's Estate, 117 Cal.
288, 49 P. 192, 194 (1897); In re Shell's Estate, 28 Colo. 167, 63 P. 413, 414 (1900); Brownlie
v. Brownlie, 357 Ill. 117, 191 N.E. 268, 273 (1934); Madden v. Comett, 290 Ky. 268, 160 S.W.2d
607, 611 (1942); Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120, 121 (1928); Minturn v. Conception
Abbey, 227 Mo. App. 1179, 61 S.W.2d 352, 361 (1933); Hale v. Smith, 73 Mont. 481, 237 P.
214, 216 (1925); In re Will of Goodson, 4 N.C. App. 257, 166 S.E.2d 447, 450 (1969); In re
Miller's Estate, 179 Pa. 645, 36 A. 139, 142 (1897); Harmon v. Ketchum, 299 S.W. 682, 686
(Tex. Ct. App. 1927); In re Burt's Estate, 122 Vt. 260, 169 A.2d 32, 35 (1961); In re Yahn's
Estate, 258 Wis. 280, 45 N.W.2d 702, 703 (1951).
75. Knox v. Knox, 95 Ala. 495, 11 So. 125, 128 (1891); In re Maescher's Estate, 78 Cal.
App. 189, 248 P. 537, 539 (1926); Dowie v. Sutton, 227 I11. 183, 81 N.E. 395, 399 (1907); Berryman
v. Sidwell, 278 Ky. 713, 129 S.W.2d 154, 163 (1939); Haines v. Hayden, 95 Mich. 332, 54 N.W.
911, 916 (1893).
76. In re Balk's Estate, 289 Mich. 703, 287 N.W. 351, 353 (1939); In re Everett's Will, 105
Vt. 291, 166 A. 827, 830 (1933).
77. Cheney v. Goldy, 225 Ill. 394, 80 N.E. 289, 291 (1907); Goodbar v. Lidikey, 136 Ind.
1, 35 N.E. 691, 692 (1893); Griffith v. Benzinger, 144 Md. 575, 125 A. 512, 517 (1924); Harvey
v. Sullens, 46 Mo. 147, 151 (1870); McDonald v. McLendon, 173 N.C. 172, 91 S.E. 1017, 1019
(1917); In re Dunlap's Estate, 471 Pa. 303, 370 A.2d 314, 317 (1977); Ferguson v. Ferguson,
169 Va. 77, 192 S.E. 774, 778 (1937). See also Pritchard v. Austin, 69 N.H. 367, 46 A. 188
(1898) (photograph admissible to show testator's "character, vigor, temperament, and disposi-
tion ... as touching the question of undue influence").
78. Reynolds v. Adams, 90 Ill. 134, 147 (1878); Reynolds v. Sevier, 165 Ky. 158, 176 S.W.
961, 963 (1915); In re Weir's Estate, 21 Or. App. 476, 535 P.2d 119, 123-24 (1975); Trost v.
Dingier, 118 Pa. 259, 12 A. 296, 298 (1888).
79. In re Paradis' Vill, 147 Me. 347, 87 A.2d 512, 518 (1952); Norris v. Bristow, 358 Mo.
1177, 219 S.W.2d 367, 370 (1949); In re Bowman's Estate, 143 Neb. 440, 9 N.W.2d 801, 803
(1943); In re Eckert's Estate, 93 Misc. 2d 677, 403 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635-36 (1978); In re Kelly's
Estate, 150 Or. 598, 46 P.2d 84, 94 (1935); In re Weir's Estate, 21 Or. App. 476, 535 P.2d
119, 124 (1975); Russell v. Boyles, 29 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. Ct. App. 1930).
80. In re Hall's Will, 252 N.C. 70, 113 S.E.2d 1, 11 (1960); In re Burris' Estate, 72 N.W.2d
884, 897 (N.D. 1955); In re Weir's Estate, 21 Or. App. 476, 535 P.2d 119, 124 (1975); Ebert
v. Ebert, 120 W. Va. 722, 200 S.E. 831, 835-36 (1939).
81. Mason v. Bowen, 122 Ark. 407, 183 S.W. 973, 975 (1916); Credille v. Credille, 123 Ga.
673, 51 S.E. 628, 630 (1905); Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 78 N.E. 1, 4 (1906); Westfall v.
Wait, 165 Ind. 353, 73 N.E. 1089, 1091 (1905); In re Kennedy's Will, 159 Mich. 548, 124 N.W.
516, 520 (1910); Schierbaum v. Schemme, 157 Mo. 1, 57 S.W. 526, 531-32 (1900); In re Putnam's
Will, 257 N.Y. 140, 177 N.E. 399, 401 (1931); Van Demark v. Tompkins, 121 Ohio St. 129,
167 N.E. 370, 372 (1929); In re Wayne's Estate, 134 Or. 464, 291 P. 356, 365 (1930); Hobson
v. Moorman, 115 Tenn. 73, 90 S.W. 152, 158 (1905).
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of witnesses or counsel concerning the use of coercion during the execution
ceremony has also been admitted. 2
Videotape could dispel accusations of undue influence employed during the
will execution. The video recording of the testator's recitation, conversation
with his attorney or witnesses, demeanor on camera, and attitude toward the
written will may provide excellent and timely evidence that the testator volun-
tarily signed the instrument as his last testament.83 Conversely, the undue in-
fluence may be so subtle that the videotape mirrors the fagade, in which
case the videotape may actually assist in the probate of an invalid will.
Case law relating to undue influence commonly includes fraud arising in
the execution or preparation of the writing. A videotape is valuable extrinsic
evidence of the absence of fraud in the execution or drafting stages. By having
the testator or a designated speaker read the will aloud before the camera,
any opportunity to insert a surprise provision or falsified page at the last
moment without the testator's knowledge would be eliminated.
Lost or Destroyed Wills
Proof of lost or destroyed wills is most often governed by statute, but case
law exists interpreting the codes. When the original written will is misplaced
or destroyed, executed duplicates or exact copies are admissible in place of
the missing version, provided the substitute is genuine.84 If the testator did
not intend to revoke a will accidentally lost or destroyed, proof of the instru-
ment's contents may be allowed under the appropriate statutory provisions."
Some statutes, however, require that the will be fraudulently destroyed" or
lost during the testator's lifetime before proof of the instrument's contents
is allowed.87 The lost or destroyed original will must have been in compliance
82. In re Callahan's Estate, 63 Cal. Rptr. 277, 67 Cal. 2d 609, 432 P.2d 965, 971 (Cal. 1967);
In re Mahnken's Estate, 92 A.D.2d 949, 460 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Rothermel
v. Duncan, 369 S.W.2d 917, 923 (Tex. 1963).
83. Cf. In re Estate of Seegers, 733 P.2d 418, 421-22 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986) (videotape of
will execution ceremony supported finding of undue influence).
84. Stiles v. Brown, 380 So. 2d 792, 794-95 (Ala. 1980); Estate of Schultz, 54 Cal. 2d 513,
6 Cal. Rptr. 281, 353 P.2d 921, 923 (1960); In re Parker's Estate, 382 So. 2d 652, 653-54 (Fla.
1980); In re Maynard's Estate, 253 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. App. 1971); In re Walsh's Estate,
196 Mich. 42, 163 N.W. 70, 78 (1917); Menzi v. White, 360 Mo. 319, 228 S.W.2d 700, 702,
705 (1950); McClellan v. Owens, 335 Mo. 884, 74 S.W.2d 570, 573 (1934); Managle v. Parker,
75 N.H. 139, 71 A. 637, 638-39 (1908); In re Woodley's Will, 73 N.Y.S.2d 141 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1947); In re Bates' Estate, 286 Pa. 583, 134 A. 513, 513 (1926); In re Dawson's Estate,
277 Pa. 168, 120 A. 828, 828-29 (1923); In re Auritt's Estate, 175 Wash. 303, 27 P.2d 713,
715 (1933) (carbon copy).
85. Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553, 559 (1860); In re Arbuckle's Estate, 98 Cal.
App. 2d 562, 220 P.2d 950, 954 (1950); In re Maynard's Estate, 253 So. 2d 923, 924 (Fla. App.
1971); In re Thorman's Estate, 162 Iowa 237, 144 N.W. 7, 8-9 (1913); Appeal of Thompson,
114 Me. 338, 96 A. 238, 239 (1915); In re Havel's Estate, 156 Minn. 253, 194 N.W. 633, 634-35
(1923); Dickey v. Malechi, 6 Mo. 177, 183-84 (1839).
86. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-40-302(2) (1987) (will must be fraudulently destroyed
during testator's life).
87. Id. § 28-40-302(2) (destruction of will must occur during testator's lifetime). But see WASH.
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with all testamentary requirements necessary to create a valid and properly
executed will. 8
Parol evidence is regularly admissible to establish the contents of a missing
will," assuming it can be shown that the will is missing despite a diligent
search.9" Courts also accept comments made by the testator concerning the
will's dispositive scheme. 9'
In this area, a videotape of the execution and oral publication of the will
(through the testamentary soliloquy) would provide ideal corroboration of
the missing document's contents as well as the authenticity of duplicates. This
would be particularly true if an unexecuted copy is the only available evidence
to support the will proponent's contentions.
Videotape Evidentiary Requirements
Most rules of evidence equate videotape with photographs and apply iden-
tical admissibility standards.' California's statute suggests that videotape could
be considered a writing,93 and this novel proposition is supported by case law.
Although audio recordings and motion pictures have been considered writings, 9'
most courts restrict videotape to a visual evidentiary role.
88. Swift v. Superior Court, 241 P.2d 217, 218 (Cal. 1952); Gaston v. Gaston, 358 So. 2d
376, 377-78 (Miss. 1978); In re Kleefeld's Estate, 55 N.Y.2d 253, 448 N.Y.S.2d 456, 459, 433
N.E.2d 521, 523 (1982); Coulson v. Sheppard, 700 S.W.2d 336, 337 ('ex. Ct. App. 1985).
89. Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553, 561-62 (1860); Allen v. Scruggs, 190 Ala.
654, 67 So. 301, 303 (1914); Cassem v. Prindle, 258 Ill. 11, 101 N.E. 241, 245 (1913); Preston
v. Preston, 149 Md. 498, 132 A. 55, 61 (1926); Pratt v. Hargraves, 77 Miss. 892, 28 So. 722,
723 (1900); In re Diener's Estate, 79 Neb. 569, 113 N.W. 149, 150 (1907); In re Miller's Will,
49 Or. 452, 90 P. 1002, 1003 (1907); Harris v. Robbins, 302 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. Ct. App.
1957); Dannenbauer v. Messerer's Estate, 62 S.W.2d 235, 238 (Tex. Ct. App. 1933).
90. Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553, 562 (1860); Jones v. Casler, 139 Ind. 382,
38 N.E. 813, 816 (1894); Goodale v. Murray, 227 Iowa 843, 289 N.W. 450, 456 (1940); Dan
v. Brown, 4 Cow. 483, 492 (N.Y. 1825).
91. Griffith v. Higinbotom, 262 Ill. 126, 104 N.E. 233, 235 (1914); Page v. Maxwell, 118
Ill. 576, 8 N.E. 852, 853 (1886); Ferguson v. Billups, 244 Ky. 85, 50 S.W.2d 35, 35 (1832);
Lane v. Hill, 68 N.H. 275, 44 A. 393, 397 (1895); In re Miller's Will, 49 Or. 452, 90 P. 1002,
1009 (1907); Glockner v. Glockner, 263 Pa. 393, 106 A. 731, 732 (1919); Clark v. Morton, 5
Rawle 235, 242 (Pa. 1835).
92. See, e.g., FED. R. Evno. 1001(2); ALAsKA R. Evm. 1001(2); AEiz. R. Evm. 1001(2); ARK.
R. EviD. 1001(2); COLO. R. EvD. 1001(2); DEL. R. EvD. 1001(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.951(2)
(west 1979); HAw. R. EvD. 1001(2); IDAHO R. EvxD. 1001(2); IowA R. EvW. 1001(2); ME.
R. EvID. 1001(2); MicH. R. EvmD. 1001(2); MNN. R. EviD. 1001(2); Miss. R. EVID. 1001(2);
MONT. R. EvD. 1001(2); N.H. R. EvID. 1001(2); N.M. R. EviD. 1001(2); N.C. R. EvD. 1001(2);
N.D. R. EvD. 1001(2); Omo R. EvD. 1001(2); Tax. R. EvID. 1001(2); Tax. R. CRai. Evm.
1001(2); UTAH R. Evil. 1001(2); VT. R. EvID. 1001(2); WAsH. R. EvmD. 1001(2); W. VA. R.
Evi. 1001(2); Wyo. R. Evin. 1001(2). The Federal Rules also contain the following definition:
"'writings' and 'recordings' consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down
by... photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording .... " FED. R. EvD.
1001(1). The Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 1(13), employs essentially identical language.
McCormick's Law of Evidence 70 n.22 (E. Cleary 2d ed. Supp. 1978).
93. CAL. EvD. CODE § 250 (,Vest 1966) (writings include "every . . . means of recording
upon any tangible thing any form of communication or representation, including letters, words,
pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof").
94. See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 854 (5th
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The common law standards for the admissibility of audio recordings, motion
pictures, or photographs95 are equally applicable to videotape. Videotape is
usually introduced as demonstrative evidence that must be authenticated by
a "live" witness on the stand.96 Naturally, the videotape must be relevant;
the tape must establish that it is more or less probable that a fact in issue
has occurred as alleged. 97 If an object depicted on videotape is itself admissible,
or if evidence of the events represented therein could be heard, then the
videotape would be sufficiently relevant to enter the record. 98
A few courts have structured an admissibility formula under which the
following elements must be demonstrated: (1) the videotape recorder was
technically capable of recording testimony; (2) the video machine operator
was competent; (3) the recording was not altered; (4) the videotape was ap-
propriately preserved; (5) the recording was both visually and audibly clear
so as not to be unintelligible or misleading; (6) the recorded testimony was
voluntary; and (7) the speakers on the videotape can be identified.9 9 Not all
Cir. 1979) (motion pictures), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); People v. Purify, 43 II1. 2d 351,
253 N.E.2d 437, 441 (1969) (audio recording); State v. Beach, 304 Minn. 302, 231 N.W.2d 75,
78-79 (1975) (audio recording). Contra In re Reed's Estate, 672 P.2d 829, 834 (Wyo. 1983).
95. Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1, 8 (1980); Paramore v. State, 229
So. 2d 855, 858-59 (1969), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 408 U.S. 935 (1972); State
v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130, 139 (1979); Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 387 A.2d
779, 785-86 (1978), aff'd, 284 Md. 516, 398 A.2d 421 (1979); People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App.
126, 197 N.W.2d 325, 329-30 (1972); State v. Lusk, 452,S.W.2d 219, 224 (Mo. 1970); State
v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697, 699-700 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972); Williams v. State, 542
P.2d 554, 575-76 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975), vacated on other grounds and remanded, 428 U.S.
906 (1976), overruled, Riggs v. Branch, 554 P.2d 823, 829 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976); Stamper
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808, 816 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 973 (1980);
State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473, 476-77 (1971). See generally G. JOSEPH,
supra note 6, § 4.02[l], at 4-3; Merlo & Sorenson, Video Tape: The Coming Courtroom Tool,
TmAJ(Nov.-Dec. 1971), at 55; Annotation, Admissibility of Videotape Film in Evidence in Criminal
Trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333, 338 (1974).
Many of the precedents cited in this footnote involved the introduction of photographs, motion
pictures, and audio recordings. Since identical evidentiary standards most often apply to videotape,
these cases provide guidelines for videotape admissibility.
96. See, e.g., Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D. Alaska
1977). See also G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][a], at 4-5; McCoRMICK's LAW OF EVIDBNCE
§ 185, at 437 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
97. FED. R. Evm. 401. See also G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02[3] [a], at 4-5; McCoRMICK'S
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185, at 437 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
98. See, e.g., Quigley v. Snoddy, 102 Ill. App. 2d 232, 242 N.E.2d 775, 777 (1968) (ad-
missibility of photo subject to same rules of relevancy as other evidence); State v. Giles, 253
La. 533, 218 So. 2d 585, 588 (1969). See generally G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][a], at
4-5 (videotape admissible on same grounds as other evidence).
99. United States v. Neal, 527 F.2d 63, 65 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom. Robinson
v. United States, 429 U.S. 845 (1976); Popplewell v. State, 269 Ind. 323, 381 N.E.2d 79, 82
(1978); Lewis v. State, 264 Ind. 288, 342 N.E.2d 859, 863 (1976); State v. Radcliff, 188 Neb.
236, 196 N.W.2d 119, 122 (1972); State v. Yarborough, 55 N.C. App. 52, 284 S.E.2d 550, 552
(1981). See generally 29 AM. JuR. 2D Evidence § 788 (1967 & Supp. 1988) (discussing authentica-
tion or verification of photographs); G. JOsEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02, at 4-4 to 4-8; Buckley
& Buckley, Videotaping Wills: A New Frontier in Estate Planning, 11 Omo N.U.L. REv. 271,
277 (1984) (listing typical requirements for admission of videotape); Elman, The Use of Videotape
Evidence in Civil Cases, 19 ALBERTA L. REv. 215, 222 (1981); Merlo & Sorenson, Videotape:
[Vol. 42:43
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judges insist upon satisfying each of these elements, but most courts require
a showing of unaltered recording, of visual and audio clarity, and of suffi-
cient identification of the speakers. To be admissible, the determinative factor
appears to be that the videotape must be established as a true and accurate
representation of the events portrayed.' 0
Those opposed to videotape usage in this setting argue that the medium
is inherently dangerous because of the potential for distorting facts through
Hollywood-like productions susceptible to sophisticated technological
manipulations. Peculiar lighting or camera angles, for example, can influence
viewers' impressions about the speakers. Similarly, audio and visual editing
can remove unfavorable sequences, slanting viewer emotions toward the desired
result.
These contentions, however, do not present insurmountable obstacles for
courts, which may exclude any evidence that is unduly prejudicial or inflam-
matory,' confusing or misleading to the jury, 0 2 cumulative, 0 3 or unnecessarily
time-consuming.0 4 If these "fairness factors" substantially outweigh the pro-
The Coming Courtroom Tool, TRIAL (Nov.-Dec. 1971), at 55, 56; Salvan, Videotape for the
Legal Community, 59 JuDiCATURE 222, 224 (1975); Annotation, Admissibility of Videotape Film
in Evidence in Criminal Trial, 60 A.L.R.3d 333, 338 (1974); Annotation, Authentication or Verifica-
tion of Photograph as Basis for Introduction in Evidence, 9 A.L.R.2d 899 (1950 & Supp. 1971,
1983).
These standards were originally established for audio tape recordings. See, e.g., State v.
Williams, 49 Wash. 2d 354, 301 P.2d 769, 772-73 (1956). However, at least one court has ruled
that the Williams sound-recording elements do not control videotape or photographs. State v.
Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473, 476-77 (1971).
A formula comparable to the seven precepts listed above has been employed when videotaped
evidence is utilized for substantive rather than demonstrative purposes. See, e.g., Torres v. State,
442 N.E.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Ind. 1982); Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979).
100. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 506 (8th Cir. 1972); Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita
Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 100 (10th Cir. 1958); Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co.,
73 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D. Alaska 1977); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130, 139 (1979);
People v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1971); Johnson v. State, 272 Ind.
427, 399 N.E.2d 360, 363 (1980); Williams v. State, 271 Ind. 476, 393 N.E.2d 183, 185 (1979);
State v. Woolridge, 2 Kan. App. 2d 449, 581 P.2d 403, 404 (1978); State v. Giles, 253 La. 533,
218 So. 2d 585, 588 (1969); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697, 700 (Ct. App. 1972);
Pease Co. v. Local Union 1787, 59 Ohio App. 2d 238, 393 N.E.2d 504, 506 (1978); Richardson
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 205 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Ct. App. 1947); State v. Newman,
4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473, 476-77 (1971).
101. See, e.g., Randall v. Warnaco, Inc., 677 F.2d 1226, 1234 (8th Cir. 1982) (dictum); Thomas
v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.S.C. 1979); Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 180
Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1, 8 (1980); Williams v. State, 271 Ind. 476, 393 N.E.2d 183, 185-86 (1979);
Bergner v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1012, 1017 (Ind. App. 1979); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d
812, 816 (Miss. 1972); O'Neill v. State, 681 S.W.2d 663, 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). See generally
G. JosEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][b], at 4-5.
102. See, e.g., Thomas v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 456 F. Supp. 566, 571 (D.S.C. 1979);
Culpepper v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 117 (1973).
See also FED. R. Evm. 403; G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][b], at 4-5 to 4-6.
103. See, e.g., Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868, 873 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
323 So. 2d 478 (La. 1975). See also FED. R. Evm. 403; G. JOsEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02[3][b], at 4-6.
104. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 403; G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.0213][b], at 4-6.
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bative value of the videotape,"s the court will exclude. This may prevent the
entire videotape from entering the record; however, in certain cases the
objectionable segments may be edited, allowing the remainder to be admitted. 06
Videotape may encounter a gauntlet of hearsay objections through which
the advocate must negotiate. As a mechanical reproduction of an out-of-court
statement offered for the truth of the matters asserted, the videotape itself
denies the opportunity for cross-examination and is, arguendo, hearsay. 07
The contents of the videotape may also constitute hearsay. For example,
"voice-overs" of narration and question/answer exchanges on videotape have
been held to be hearsay if the tape is presented to demonstrate the truth of
the speech therein.'" The simple solution is to utilize videotape as proof of
something other than the truth of the assertions contained therein.
Hurdles to admissibility presented by hearsay objections are easily cir-
cumvented by asserting the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule. "Disem-
bodied voices" and the appurtenant details discussed on the videotape may
be verified by the direct testimony of a witness." 9 A videotaped will falls
within several hearsay exceptions, including res gestae,"0 present-sense im-
pression,' then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition," 2 recorded
105. See, e.g., FED. R. Evw. 403.
106. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 459 N.E.2d 730, 732-33 (Ind. 1984); Reggio v. Louisiana Gas
Serv. Co., 333 So. 2d 395, 402 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 526 (La. 1976); Lawton
v. Jewish Hosp., 679 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5,
498 P.2d 697, 700 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972). See also G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.02[3], at 4-7.
Cf. Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 1983) (inadmissibility
of soundtrack); Brewer v. Jeep Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1147, 1149 (W.D. Ark. 1982), aff'd, 724
F.2d 653 (8th Cir. 1983) (inclusion of written instructions with video).
107. See, e.g., State v. Simon, 174 A. 867, 872 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1934), aff'd, 178 A. 728 (N.J.
1935) (audio recording).
108. See, e.g., Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1117 (8th Cir. 1985)
(hypnosis question/answer session videotaped); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cooper, 485 So. 2d
1364, 1366 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (voice-over on videotape); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498
P.2d 697, 700 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972) (voice-over on videotape). See also G. JOSEPH, supra note
6, § 4.02[4][a], at 4-9 to 4-10.
109. See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 377 F.2d 255, 258 (6th Cir. 1967) (witness must iden-
tify circumstances surrounding photographed events); State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d
697, 700 (Ct. App. 1972). See also G. JOSEPH, supra note 6, § 4.0214][a], at 4-10.
110. See, e.g., Torres v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. 1982) (words simultaneously ut-
tered at time of occurrence may be admissible within res gestae exception to hearsay rule). Res
gestae primarily includes spontaneous statements that modern decisions classify under other ex-
ceptions such as present sense impression, then existing mental, emotional, or physical condi-
tion, excited utterances, and the like. McCORMCK's LAW OF EVIDENCE § 288, at 686 (E. Cleary
2d ed. 1972). Res gestate is a vague and imprecise exception that has stirred the ire of many
commentators. Id. § 288, at 687. "The ancient phrase can well be jettisoned, with due acknowledg-
ment that it has served well in its era in the evolution of evidence law." Id.
111. See, e.g., FED. R. Evn,. 803(1). For case law discussing this exception, see, e.g., Pfeil
v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 861 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1107 (1986); United States
v. Earley, 657 F.2d 195, 198 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 785-86
(7th Cir. 1979) (involving audio recording); Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (D.N.J. 1982).
112. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(3); McMORMcK's LAW OF EvrDENCE §§ 291, 294, at 689-90,
694-96 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). For case law analyzing this exception, see, e.g., Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285, 296 (1892); United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 991
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recollection to refresh a witness' memory,"' and the unavailability and "all-
purpose" exceptions." 4
Admission or exclusion of videotaped evidence depends upon sound judicial
discretion. " The courts that have discussed probate videotapes have not men-
tioned the basis of admission." 6 The following section examines the opinions
of Indiana's probate judges concerning Indiana's video will statute.
Judicial Reaction to Video Wills in Indiana
The authors conducted a survey of Indiana probate judges to gauge judicial
receptivity to utilizing videotape for probate purposes. Although the
methodology employed in conducting this survey would not be used by statisti-
cians, the results are not intended to provide generalized predictions of judicial
behavior. In a state with less than one hundred probate judges, these results
are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results may provide some
insight as to how Indiana judges will interpret and apply the Indiana video
will statute.
The questionnaire posed to the judges an Indiana estate hypothetical in-
volving typical contest issues. Specifically, the hypothetical situation presented
was as follows:
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); United States v. Cosby, 601 F.2d 754, 759 (5th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Layton, 549 F. Supp. 903, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (involving audio
recording), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1069 (1984).
113. See, e.g., FED. R. Evm. 803(5); McCojIcic's LAw op EVIDENCE §§ 299-303, at 712-16
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972). For case law interpreting this exception, see, e.g., United States v. Kelly,
349 F.2d 720, 770-71 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966); Kinsey v. State, 49 Ariz.
201, 65 P.2d 1141, 1148-49 (1937).
114. See, e.g., FED. R. Evrn. 804 (unavailability); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) ("all-purpose"
exception); McCoRunCK's LAW Op EVIDENCE § 324.1 at 95-97 (E. Cleary 2d ed. Supp. 1978).
For case law discussing this exception, see, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456,
461-63 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1128 (2d Cir. 1980) (concern-
ing audio recording), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871 (1980); United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787,
790 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 764-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
115. See, e.g., Roberts v. Hollocher, 664 F.2d 200, 204 (8th Cir. 1981) (photograph); Pritchard
v. Downie, 326 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1964) (photograph or movie); Pisel v. Stamford Hosp.,
180 Conn. 314, 430 A.2d 1, 8 (1980); State v. Giles, 253 La. 533, 218 So. 2d 585, 588 (1969)
(photo); Owens v. Thornton, 349 So. 2d 431, 434 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Reggio v. Louisiana
Gas Serv. Co., 333 So. 2d 395, 402 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 337 So. 2d 526 (La. 1976);
Ashley v. Nissan Motor Corp., 321 So. 2d 868, 872 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 323 So. 2d
478 (La. 1975); Terrio v. McDonough, 16 Mass. App. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190, 196, reh. denied,
390 Mass. 1102, 453 N.E.2d 1231 (1983); Hueper v. Goodrich, 263 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Minn.
1978) (photograph); Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812, 816 (Miss. 1972); Lawton v. Jewish
Hosp., 679 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 71 A.D.2d 515,
423 N.Y.S.2d 694, 698 (1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 114, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 417 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y.
1981); O'Neill v. State, 681 S.W.2d 663, 671 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (photographs); Air Shields,
Inc. v. Spears, 590 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (photographs); Stamper v.
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 257 S.E.2d 808, 816 (1979) (photographs), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
972 (1980); State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473, 477 (1971).
116. See In re Estate of Seegers, 733 P.2d 418, 421-22 (Okla. Ct. App. 1986); In re Purported
Last Will and Testament of Stotlar, CA No. 1149 (Del. Ch. 1987) (LEXIS, Del. library).
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Facts: In re Estate of Penny Moneygrubber
A written will is submitted for probate without a self-proving clause. The
document is dated and signed by the testator and two witnesses and contains
the usual "boilerplate" testamentary language. Opponents of the will allege
that several pages of the instrument were replaced or modified. They also
question the testator's mental capacity and suggest that fraud in the execu-
tion and undue influence may have occurred. Some portions of the will are
ambiguous in the description of property and the expression of beneficiaries.
For example, the will refers to real estate located in Boise County, and the
testator owned no property there. Also, the will awards a cash sum to "my
nephew, Donald H. Moneygrugger," when, in fact, the testator had a nephew
named Ronald T. Moneygrubber and a cousin named Donald H. Assumpsit.
The will proponents offer a videotape of the testator reciting verbatim the
written will. The video recording also captured the execution ceremony, as
well as "close-ups" of the written will in its entirety. The videotape includes
a sound track, and both the audio and visual portions are readily comprehen-
sible. The videotape also contains a segment in which the testator left per-
sonal messages to her beneficiaries (and disowned heirs), and in which she
correctly named all persons. The will contestants, however, object to the
videotape as inadmissible." 7
Ninety-three Indiana county judges for circuit, superior, and special pro-
bate courts were contacted. Their oral and written responses to the questions
of Whether they would admit the videotape under the statute as evidence of
execution and as extrinsic evidence of other factors are categorized below.
Eighty-nine judges responded by written survey and/or telephone conversa-
tions with the author. All figures given are percentages.







Questions Yes No Undecided Comment





Contents of Written Will
Absence of Undue Influence
Absence of Fraud in Exec.
To Resolve Ambiguities in Written
Will
If written will unambiguous,
is videotape still admissible?
If written will had self-proving clause,
is videotape still admissible?
Are operator affidavits required?
Is proof of proper equipment
operation required?
Is chain of custody required?
Is proof that videotape not tampered
with required?
Is Time/Date generator adequate proof
of no tampering?
Is admissibility standard same as
photographs/sound recording?
Does four-corners rule preclude
videotape admissibility?
Is videotape admissible as proof of
lost/destroyed will?
Is videotape useful in probate?
Is videotape satisfactory as will itself?
(if statute enacted)
Is videotape heard in probate cases?
Have you heard videotape in civil/
criminal cases?








































































Given the language of the Indiana video will statute," 8 not surprisingly nearly
118. IND. CODE ANx. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns Supp. 1988), which provides: "Subject to the ap-
plicable Indiana rules of trial procedure, a videotape may be admissible as evidence of the proper
execution of a will."
1989]
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94 percent of the respondent judges would admit videotape as proof of proper
execution. The data suggests that the courts also would find videotape readily
acceptable to resolve written ambiguities or as parol evidence of testamentary
capacity and intent, contents of the written will, and the absence of fraud
and undue influence. Somewhat more curious was the indicated tolerance of
video documentation of intent even if the will was not ambiguous. Case law
has persistently declared that testamentary intent must be determined from
the instrument itself unless ambiguities appear on its face. Nevertheless, 75
percent of the judges indicated that the four-corners rule would not affect
videotape admissibility on this issue.
According to the judges' responses, some documentation of equipment and
operator competency is necessary. Nearly 78 percent of the judges surveyed
would prefer a video technician's testimony or affidavit to verify the integrity
of the filming. Slightly more than 61 percent desired proof that the equip-
ment functioned suitably, while almost 49 percent would require chain-of-
custody to be established for the videotape. This "chain" requirement un-
doubtedly arose from the judges' familiarity with criminal rules, and the af-
firmative and negative responses were the most evenly distributed.
A slight majority of those surveyed would allow videotape to corroborate
the contents of a lost or destroyed written will. Nearly 71 percent of the judicial
respondents would require documentation that the videotape had not been
manipulated, but just over 61 percent felt that a time/date generator alone
would accomplish this task.
As expected, the largest majority (almost 97 percent) would apply the
common law rules of admissibility for photographs and sound recordings to
videotape evidence. In response to the more general question of a videotape's
utility in probate proceedings, an identical majority acknowledged its value,
although almost half disliked the concept of a videotape serving as a separate,
valid testamentary document under an enabling statute.
None of the judges surveyed had presided over a probate case in which
videotape was offered into the record, but nearly 84 percent were accustomed
to the use of videotape for other civil or criminal law purposes. Fifty-five
percent had admitted videotaped depositions, and videotape had been admitted
as evidence for crime scenes (16 percent), child sexual abuse testimony and
defendants' confessions (13 percent each), accident scenes and driving while
intoxicated (10 percent each), experiments (7 percent), and "day-in-the-life"
and miscellaneous witness statements (less than 4 percent each). One judicial
respondent had even seen videotape offered on the question of parental fitness
for child custody in a dissolution matter. " 9
Most judges elected not to elaborate beyond the specific inquiries posed
by the survey, but a few representative remarks included the following: (1)
"I've had no experience with videotape apart from depositions in civil cases.
I would be very liberal in permitting use of such tapes in will matters if they
119. This data was collected by the authors, from the Judicial Responses to the Video Will




were probative of any matter in issue." (2) "A court would be foolish to
stand in the way of advancing technology. Videotapes will be used more and
more in the future." (3) "Many of the questions which could be raised would
be best handled by appropriate legislation." (4) "I think with proper safeguards
to insure authenticity [videotape] can be a valuable tool [for probate]." (5)
"Videotaped wills are silly!" (6) "Videotape will not stop fraud, [it will] just
make it more sophisticated."' 2
Clearly, the vast majority of Indiana probate judges who responded are
receptive to the use of videotape in proving the usual points of contention
in will contests. Practitioners may find videotape to be routinely acceptable
as proof of execution, capacity, intent, will content, lack of undue influence
and fraud, as well as to resolve ambiguities. Although predictions of actual
judicial behavior cannot be drawn from this data, it would be safe to con-
clude that videotape captured rave reviews in the Indiana probate courts. These
survey results indicate that one may be securely optimistic in predicting
videotape's increasing significance in the probate arena.
Existing and Proposed Legislation
Indiana
Indiana was the first, and to date, the only state to enact legislation
specifically addressing the use of videotape in the probate process. In 1985,
House Enrolled Act 1913 was passed by the Indiana general assembly allow-
ing videotape to be admitted during probate as evidence of a valid will execu-
tion.' 2' The Act was codified in the section of the Indiana Code governing
the execution of wills.12 2 As originally introduced, the Act required that the
entire execution ceremony be taped in a single continuous session.1 23 The
testator was to be taped reciting the entire will, and the testator and witnesses
were to be shown throughout the act of execution.' 2 As enacted, the provi-
sion allowed any part or all of the execution process to be videotaped.'2 5 The
section provided as follows: "Subject to the applicable Indiana rules of trial
procedure, a videotape may be admissible as evidence of the proper execution
of a will.'"126
The provision, as enacted, was merely an enabling statute providing little
guidance; rather it invited innovative use of videotape and requires the courts
120. Excerpts from "Additional Comments," Video Will Survey of Indiana Probate Judges,
by the authors, April/May 1988.
121. H.B. 1913, 104th Ind. Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 273-1985. For a discussion
of the history of Indiana's videotaped wills statute see Buckley, Indiana's New Videotaped Wills
Statute: Launching Probate into the 21st Century, 20 VAL. U.L. REv. 83 (1985).
122. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns Supp. 1988).
123. H.B. 1913, 104th Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 273-1985. See also Buckley,
Indiana's New Videotaped Wills Statute: Launching Probate into the 21st Century, 20 VAL. U.L.
REv. 83, 86-87 (1985) (discussing original requirements of Bill 1913).
124. H.B. 1913, 104th Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., Pub. L. No. 273-1985.
125. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3 (Burns Supp. 1988).
126. Id.
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to establish its limitations. Although broad in its use of videotape as evidence
of proper will execution, its application was limited to that purpose.
In 1989, an amendment bill was introduced seeking to eliminate the videotape
provision. The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, reinstated the
language. 21 When the House considered this legislation, the House Judiciary
Committee expanded videotape's evidentiary role. Under the modified resolu-
tion, videotape would be admissible as evidence of (1) the proper execution
of a will; (2) the intentions of a testator; (3) the mental state or capacity of
a testator; (4) the authenticity of a will; and (5) matters determined by a court
to be relevant to the probate of a will.' 28 This new language would immensely
broaden the scope of the statute and further increase the value of videotape
as an evidentiary tool.
In January 1988, another amendment would have authorized the use of
videotape in living wills. 1 29 The provisions regarding living wills read as follows:
(e) If a living will declarant or a life-prolonging procedures will
declarant makes a videotape that demonstrates:
(1) the proper execution of the declaration;
(2) the intention of the declarant;
(3) the mental state or capacity of the declarant; or
(4) the authenticity of the declaration;
the attending physician (if provided a copy of the videotape) shall
make a copy of the videotape a part of the declarant's medical
records. However, the physician's failure to do so does not affect
the validity of the declaration.
(h) A videotape may be used to demonstrate the following:
(1) The proper execution of the declaration.
(2) The intentions of the declarant.
(3) The mental state or capacity of the declarant.
(4) The authenticity of the declaration.' 30
This proposal has not yet been enacted.
New Jersey
In September 1986, the New Jersey legislature introduced an act providing
127. S.B. 147, 106th Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1989). The language was reinstated
following protests by the author. See Letters of Jan. 23, 1989, from William R. Buckley to
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 106th Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1989).
128. S.E.A. 147, 106th Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., Pub. L. No. 262, 1989. The Gover-
nor signed this legislation May 1, 1989. The House inserted its modifying language based upon
H.B. 1181, 105th Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1987), suggested by the author. See Letters
of March 15, 1989 from William R. Buckley to members of the House Judiciary Committee,
106th Ind. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (1989).
129. H.B. 1087, 105th Ind. Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (1988). For additional discussion of
videotaping living wills, see Buckley, Videotaping Living Wills: Dying Declarations Brought to
Life, 22 VAL. U.L. Rv. 39 (1987).




for the use of videotape as a testamentary instrument.
31 The proposal was
extremely broad, allowing videotape to be used not merely as an evidentiary
tool but as a valid will itself, provided it was accompanied by a written
transcription.'3 2 The bill was favorably reported upon by the Assembly Judicial
Committee in the spring of 1987, but it was not enacted. The bill set forth
a detailed account of what the videotape must include and the steps to be
followed in the taping process. The bill read as follows:
3B:3-2. Formal execution of will.
2. A videotape is valid as a will, if it is accompanied by a written
transcription and otherwise complies with the requirement set forth
in N.J.S. 3B:3-1 et seq.
3. The videotaped will shall additionally comply with the follow-
ing requirements:
a. The testator shall appear before the camera with
at least two witnesses and his attorney. He shall an-
nounce to them that this videotape session is his last
will and testament and request that they act as witnesses;
b. The attorney shall question the testator during the
filming of the videotape to demonstrate the testator's
sound mind and satisfactory memory and understanding
of the event;
c. The testator shall recite aloud the entire contents
of the will, which recitation must be videotaped in its
entirety in a continuous fashion so that there are no
interruptions in the videotape;
d. The testator must appear on the videotape during
the entire recording session;
e. The videotape must possess a sound track
recording;
f. The audio and visual quality must be sufficiently
clear and intelligible so as to be readily comprehended
and so as to readily identify the testator, witnesses, and
attorney;
g. The videotape must be made self proved by
simultaneously executing a written document pursuant
to the provisions of N.J.S. 3B:3-4 which shall set forth
the name and address of the video operator;
h. The execution of the self proving document shall
also be videotaped and the testator, witnesses, and of-
ficer shall appear before the camera; and
i. The videotape must be taped with a time and date
generator.
131. H.B. 3030, 202nd N.J. Leg., 1st yr. Sess. (1986).
132. Id.
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4. The videotaped will, along with the self proving document,
shall be retained by the testator and a duplicate copy of both the
videotaped will and the self proving document shall be retained
by the testator's attorney. The duplicate copy shall be clearly
marked as a copy and it shall be stated on the recording that it
is a copy and is not to be used as a will.
5. A videotaped will may be reproduced from one type of
videotape to another type of video medium, provided that:
a. The testator declares in writing that he intends the
replication to operate as a republication of the original
videotaped will;
b. The replication occurs in the presence and under
the direction and supervision of the testator;
c. The reproduced video recording complies with all
the requirements for videotaped wills;
d. A written self proving document is simultaneous-
ly executed pursuant to N.J.S. 3B:3-4 and paragraph
g, of section 3 of this act, which sets forth the date and
location of replication, the testator's intention to
replicate and republish the original videotaped will, the
testator's purpose for the replication and the names and
addresses of all persons present or involved in the
replication process; and
e. The original reproduced video recording shall be
retained by the testator and the self proving document
shall be attached to the reproduced video recording.
6. A videotaped will which meets the provisions of this act will
may [sic] be admitted to probate without further affidavit, deposi-
tion or proof. A videotaped will which fails to meet the provisions
of this act may be admitted to probate only in solemn form in
the manner provided by the Rules Governing the Courts of the
State of New Jersey.133
If enacted as proposed, the bill would establish explicit guidelines for the
practitioner. Because of its comprehensive approach, the bill should be sub-
ject to very little misinterpretation by the courts or misapplication by attorneys.
Conversely, the provision's exhaustive nature may prevent innovative use by
practitioners and would give courts little or no discretion in ruling on a
videotaped will's validity.
New York
In 1987, a bill was proposed in the New York legislature that would have
allowed videotape to be admitted in probate proceedings.,34 The proposal would
133. Id.
134. S. Res. 5098, 210th N.Y. Leg. (1987-88) (bill proposed additional section 1407-a to Sur-




have created a new section providing for the use of videotape as an eviden-
tiary tool in proving a will.' 3 However, it has not yet been enacted. The pro-
vision read as follows:
§ 1407-a. Additional proof
In addition to other procedures prescribed for the proof of wills,
a videotape may be admissible during probate proceedings as
evidence of the following:
1. The proper execution of a will;
2. The intentions of the testator as indicated in a will;
3. The mental state or capacity of the testator;
4. The authenticity of a will; and
5. Any other facts that, in the court's discretion, are relevant
to the probate of the testator's will or the administration
of the testator's estate.
36
Although strictly evidentiary in nature, the proposed section is fairly broad
as it expressly provides for application if relevant in the court's discretion.
This subsection not only would retain the court's substantial discretion, it
would encourage practitioners to use videotape in original and experimental
ways.
Texas
In 1985, the Texas legislature introduced two bills concerning the use of
videotape as evidence in probate proceedings. 137 House Bill 247, companion
to Senate Bill 732 and identical to it, 138 provided for the application of
videotape or film of the will ceremony as an evidentiary tool. 39 Neither bill
was enacted, but H.B. 247 read as follows:
Sec. 84A. FILM OR VIDEOTAPE AS EVIDENCE.
(a) A film or videotape recording of the execution of a will is
admissible as evidence of the identity and competency of the person
making the will, and of any other matter relating to the will and
its validity.
(b) This section does not prevent the supreme court from adopt-
ing rules of evidence relating to the use of film and videotape
evidence in other proceedings, or from supplementing this section
with other rules not inconsistent with this section.'
4
1
Although limited to admission for purely evidentiary purposes, the language
of this proposal was sufficiently broad to allow for virtually unrestricted ad-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Tex. H.B. 247, 69th Leg. (1985); Tex. S.B. 732, 69th Leg. (1985).
138. Tex. S.B. 732, 69th Leg. (1985).
139. Tex. H.B. 247, 69th Leg. (1985).
140. Id.
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mission.14 1 Expressly providing for admission as evidence of the testator's
"identity and competency" is unnecessary surplusage in view of the follow-
ing clause allowing videotape to be admitted as evidence of anything relevant
to the will and its validity. 4" The testator's identity and competency are cer-
tainly relevant to the validity of the will. Perhaps the testator's competency
was expressly referred to because that was the primary purpose for which
the provision was intended, but that is unclear.
Proposed Model Statute-Evidentiary
A videotape may be admissible during probate proceedings as evidence of:
(1) the proper execution of a will;
(2) the intentions of the testator;
(3) the mental state or capacity of the testator;
(4) the authenticity of a will; and
(5) any other facts that, in the court's discretion, are relevant to the pro-
bate of the testator's will or the administration of the testator's estate.1
4 3
This proposed statute expressly authorizes the admission of videotape only
for evidentiary proposes. Each evidentiary element of proof in the probate
process could be addressed by the use of videotape, and the court would have
broad discretion to admit any facts "relevant to the probate."
Proposed Model Statute-Testamentary Instrument
A videotape may be admissible as a will, [either with or without a written
transcription,] provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the testator must recite aloud the entire contents of the will;
(2) such recitation must be videotaped in its entirety in a con-
tinuous fashion, so that there are no interruptions in the videotape;
(3) the testator must appear on the videotape during the entire
recording session;
(4) the videotape must possess a soundtrack recording;
(5) the audio and visual recording must be of a sufficiently clear
and intelligible quality as to be readily comprehended upon display;
and
(6) a written self-proving or acknowledgment document must be
executed contemporaneously with the videotape recording of the
will.
(a) The self-proving or acknowledgment instrument
must be signed by the testator (or by another person
at the direction and in the presence of the testator) and









(b) The execution of the self-proving or acknowledg-
ment document may [shall] also be videotaped with the
testator and attesting witnesses appearing together within
the camera's field of vision during recordation of the
execution ceremony.[;] [and]
[(7) a written transcription may [shall] accompany the videotaped
will, and such a writing shall contain a provision in which the person
that prepared the transcript states, under oath, that the writing
was made contemporaneously with the videotape.]'"
Any provision allowing a videotape to function as a written will must be
drafted to avoid the dangers the writing requirement was designed to prevent.
By requiring a continuous recording of the execution ceremony, possible
tampering with the tape, which may arise if there are a number of stops and
starts, would be reduced. 4 ' Even without the optional addition of the written
transcription, the signature requirement is satisfied by an accompanying self-
proving document. The explicit guidelines set forth by the provision would
prevent misuse of this new medium in the probate process and would foster
uniformity in its use and application.
The Future of Probate Videotape
The use of probate video is in its infancy. Videotape technology was not
developed until the 1950s' 6 and did not become widely available and afford-
able until the late 1970s and early 1980s.147
As recently as eight to ten years ago, the concept of probate video had
not yet entered legal literature and commentary. Within the past eight years,
probate video has begun to enter the mainstream of estate planning as more
articles are written,' 48 statutes introduced (one even being enacted),'4 9 and
public awareness of the technique increases.'5  As with most innovative tech-
niques, videotape in the probate process has its skeptics."'
Eventually more jurisdictions will enact provisions expressly authorizing the
use of videotape as evidence of the will execution ceremony and as a replace-
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., 2 C. Scott, PHoToGRA,'sc EVIDENCE § 716 (1969) ("Videotape was first
demonstrated in 1951 and was in commercial use by 1954."); Salvan, Videotape for the Legal
Community, 59 JuDicATURE 222, 222-24 (1975) (Ampex Corporation invented videotape in 1956
and its first commercial use occurred on November 30, 1956).
147. Inspection of current television, radio, and newspaper ads clearly shows relatively low
cost and widespread availability of videotape recorders, video cameras, and related products.
148. See supra note 18.
149. See supra the section "Existing and Proposed Legislation."
150. See, e.g., School, Safeguard Your Will, Today's Catholic, Oct. 25, 1985, at 2-B, col.
1; Personal Law: Where There's a Way, There May Not be a Will, 39 CHcNANI Tms 89 (June
1985); Berardinelli, Technology Beat: Immortal Movies and Paper Briefcases, Tex. Press Clipping
Bureau Dallas, Nov. 5, 1984, at 243, col. 1.
151. S. Smith, "Anticipating the Defense of Will Contests" (A.B.A. videotape 1983) (fears
problems with videotape outweigh its potential benefits).
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ment/alternative to a written Will. The speed with which such techniques gain
widespread support will continue to increase as the legal profession and the
lay community become more comfortable with these new methodologies.
Just as written wills may become relegated to history, so too may videotaped
wills. As technology continues its incessant progress, new methods of
documenting a testator's last wishes will emerge, many of which are beyond
speculation. One that seems plausible is the "hologramic" will. By use of
laser-generated, three-dimensional images, near perfect reproductions of
testators will be possible. Such recordings, rather than being on a magnetic
tape, could be stored in a microchip small enough to fit on the head of a
pin. Testators would be able to carry all of their valuable documents, including
their wills, with them at all times and perhaps even have some of them
surgically implanted in their bodies.
Conclusion
Attorneys dedicated to providing clients with the best legal services available
must remain abreast of technological developments that impact the legal pro-
fession. Videotape, a relatively recent advancement, is increasingly utilized
in both civil and criminal arenas and is beginning to make its way into the
probate context. Videotape potentially may serve two separate probate func-
tions: (1) as an evidentiary tool to prove certain elements of a valid will; and/or
(2) as constituting the testamentary instrument itself. Utilizing videotape in
these ways is highly advantageous because as accuracy is refined, testamen-
tary intent is clarified, and will contests are discouraged.
A number of procedural barriers may temporarily impede the use of
videotape in probate. If offered as the actual testamentary document, an ena-
bling statute is necessary to circumvent the traditional writing requirement,
unless the surrounding circumstances fall within holographic will parameters.
If offered for purely evidentiary purposes, videotape constitutes excellent ex-
trinsic proof of testamentary intent, capacity, proper execution, and lack of
fraud or undue influence. When utilized for these evidentiary purposes,
videotape must satisfy the same evidentiary requirements encountered by tradi-
tional forms of extrinsic evidence offered on these issues. Videotape is generally
held to the admissibility standards applicable to photographs, audio recor-
dings, or motion pictures. The most important admissibility concern is that
the tape be a true and accurate representation of the events portrayed. The
introduction of videotape will likely be met with a battery of hearsay objec-
tions, although most of these can easily be overcome. Ultimately, admissibili-
ty is at the court's discretion and the videotape may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by other equitable concerns.
To date, Indiana is the only state to enact a probate video statute. A poll
of Indiana probate judges indicates that the judiciary views the statute
favorably as an evidentiary tool. Other state legislatures, including New Jersey,
New York, and Texas, have proposed probate provisions allowing the introduc-
tion of videotapes either as evidence or as the will itself. None of these pro-
posals have yet been passed into law.
[Vol. 42:43
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The law governing video probate is still in its formative stages. However,
the concept is maturing, and in the best interests of justice, its use should
gain rapid support as videotape is proven to be a highly accurate and in-
valuable tool in the probate arena. In the interests of professionalism, at-
torneys should seek to avail themselves and their clients of the significant
edge offered by the use of videotape in probate.
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